

Trade Unions, Migrant Workers, and Education Background in China

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to understand the possibility of migrant workers joining trade unions by analyzing labor disputes, employment characteristics and social-demographic characteristics. Relying on data from a survey, 823 of which were migrant workers, conducted in Shanghai and nine other cities in China, this study investigated the situation that migrant workers face in trade union participation on both an associational (organizational membership) and a behavioral (activity participation) aspect. The findings of this study show that rural migrant workers do not appear to have a high level of union participation, as had expected taking into account of the labor market position of this group and the effort Chinese unions made in recruitment among them due to a number of barriers that rural migrant workers face in seeking to become union members or join union activities. The first one is the availability of trade unions in the workplace, with the finding that migrant workers in state-owned firms have a much higher probability of participating unions than those in private firms, where unions' presence is relatively weak. Secondly, discrimination based on occupation and employment status within workplaces hinders rural migrant workers from joining unions. Thirdly, the organizational trust on trade unions is relatively low among Chinese migrant workers. All three of these obstacles are likely to relate to the close relationship that unions have with the government. The close relationship that unions have with the government may undermine unions' legitimacy among this group of workers and impede their engagement.

Keywords: *trade unions, migrant workers, social inclusion*

Introduction

The number of rural migrant workers has increased dramatically over recent decades,

representing a considerable part of the workforce across the world. It has become a global issue to promote the inclusion of migrant workers into receiving societies. With an important role in the labor market, trade unions can serve in many ways for migrant worker integration (Gorodzeisky & Richards, 2016). The most critical action unions can undertake is to involve migrant workers as members and stand for them. From the viewpoint of unions, migrant workers are potentially powerful resources to maintain their sustainability. Faced with substantial membership decline from the middle of the last century, unions have been attempting for revitalization across many western countries (Hodder & Edwards, 2015). Much of the emphasis on this revitalization concerns efforts in organizing strategies, aiming to stem the fall in union density by expanding membership among demographic groups that have historically been underrepresented (Behrens et al., 2004; Mustchin, 2012). Migrant workers make up a large proportion of target groups for this renewal strategy, and recruitment of these workers plays a big role in union revitalization (Turner, Cross, & O'Sullivan, 2014). In this regard, promotion of the involvement of migrant workers into unions is not only important with respect to social inclusion, but also crucial for the sustainability of unions.

Some specific features of the Chinese context make it an essential case in exploring migrant workers' union participation. First of all, the number of Chinese rural migrant workers has reached 277 million in 2015 and these workers represent a rising proportion of national workforces. And they have been largely unorganized and unrepresented for decades (Pun & Smith, 2007). The unionization rate for this group, 39.9% in 2012, still lagged behind that for urban workers, which was 47.2% or 175.3 million members out of the 371 million population (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2013). Moreover, coming from rural areas, migrant workers are likely to arrive in the city with little, if any, prior contact or direct understanding of unions. Secondly, the government has a strong influence upon unions' policy or action in China (Chan, et al., 2006). This characteristic could make the involvement of migrant workers happen in a quite different way compared with the process in western societies. Thirdly, recruitment of migrant workers as members is likely to lead to a transformation of trade unions in China. With their members traditionally working in public sector where labor disputes are rare, unions perform their functions well in assisting production and providing welfare. However, the

majority of rural immigrants are employed in the private sector with rapidly increasing labor disputes since the mid-1990s (Frenkel & Sydow, 2015). Increasing the membership with more migrant workers, unions will need to struggle to stand for them in labor disputes and take a bigger and more active role in protecting workers' rights, otherwise they will lose their legitimacy.

The trade union participation of migrant workers has been increasingly investigated. Literature has analyzed this participation mainly in the context of the UK, the US and other western countries (James & Karmowska, 2010; Hardy, Eldring, & Schulten, 2012; Pulignano, Meardi, & Doerflinger, 2015; Marino, Penninx, & Rooshlad, 2015). However, very little is known about the situation of Chinese rural migrant workers face in terms of trade union participation. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to understand the possibility of migrant workers joining trade unions by analyzing labor disputes, employment characteristics and social-demographic characteristics, so as to solve the problem of fewer trade union members and protect the rights and interests of migrant workers.

Trade unions and migrant workers in China

An understanding of the relationship between unions and migrant workers is critical in advancing the debate on union revitalization strategies (Frege & Kelly, 2003). Trade unions are primarily organizations that function to represent members' individual and collective interests (Allen, 1966). As Pencavel (1971) points out, unions carry out their jobs at collective levels (e.g. bargaining, representation), semi-collective level (e.g. individual representation under a collective procedure) and individual level (e.g. legal services). Unions serve in various ways to narrow the gap in power between workers and employers, overcoming the limit of individual action and facilitating workers' activity in pursuit of certain goals (Cornfield, 1991; Hyman, 1997). Particularly, as organizations with monopoly power restrict the supply of labor to various firms and industries, unions protect their member's interests against employer demands (Freeman & Medoff, 1984). Through collective actions like strikes, unions can initiate a work stoppage, which is capable of interrupting the operating of employers' business, putting pressure on employers to make efforts to reach an agreement that is acceptable to both sides.

With the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) as the headquarter,

Chinese trade unions, as a whole, is a pyramidal, top-down organization that consists of national, regional and primary levels (Liu, Li, & Kim, 2015). Compared with its counterparts in western countries, trade unions in China have their own characteristics. The fundamental one is that it speaks on behalf of the rights of employee, on the one hand, and represents the interest of the country, on the other hand. In other words, unions perform “dual function,” providing employee services and also resolving disputes, maintaining labor discipline, and administering welfare programs for the state (Chan, et al., 2006). Particularly, the ACFTU is a formal part of the political structure, having quasi-government status (Chen, 2009). For a long time, diverged somewhat from the jobs that unions are generally presumed to carry out, the prior duties of Chinese unions were assisting production, organizing recreation, and dispensing welfare (Solinger, 2009). Through collective voice and state-party voice, unions help to increase the employment stability of workers (Wei, Dong, & Jin, 2015) and improve wages, nonwage compensation and training (Ge, 2014).

It is legal for Chinese workers to build up their trade unions in a bottom-up way. Any new trade union must first acquire official recognition from the ACFTU, or an industrial or local trade union under the ACFTU. Otherwise, none of these new organizations can become registered as trade unions and enjoy the rights granted to trade unions by law. The amendments in 1992 and 2001 continue this provision, with result that the only legal trade unions that the government recognizes are those under the leadership of the ACFTU (Cooke, 2015). With little, if any, exception, these unions are built in a top-down way (Lin & Ju, 2011). Migrant workers have not been identified as eligible members of trade unions for decades. From the 1980s onwards, the number of workers with a rural immigrant background in Chinese cities has been gradually rising. The export-oriented and labor-intensive industrialization strategy of China in the last three decades has created a huge shortage in labor supply in urban areas. As a consequence, employment opportunities were available for rural workers who want to have higher incomes by migration. It is worth noting that this industrialization strategy also subjected Chinese workers to exploitative labor regimes (Leung, 2015). Rural migrant workers are those who suffer most. Migrant workers’ employment clusters primarily in the private sector where levels of labor protection are low (Cook, 2015). They typically undertake jobs with

low pay, insecurity and often hazardous working conditions (Knight & Yueh, 2009). Moreover, the Hukou system serves as an institutional barrier for them to gain full access to public services in the city (Swider, 2015). This system privileges local residents against non-local residents in many aspects (Cooke, 2015). Particularly, trade unions have excluded migrant workers from union membership for a long time.

Similar to what happened in some western countries, involving rural migrant workers became a policy agenda when Chinese unions were under pressures and struggled to pursue renewal strategies for growth and recovery. The number of union members declined sharply from 103.2 million in 1990 to 86.9 million in 1999. Without the involvement of rural migrant workers, Chinese unions encountered a serious setback in reversing declining membership levels. According to the report of 14th ACFTU Congress held at the end of 2003, for the first time, that rural migrant workers had become new members and an important part of Chinese working class.

Some factors may influence the union joining behavior of migrant workers. The levels of exploitation faced by migrant workers have been identified as a motivating factor for them to become involved in unions (Meardi, 2007). Most migrant workers get their jobs at the bottom of the occupational ladder, mainly manual jobs in the secondary labor market (Arango et al., 2009). Dissatisfaction with wages and working conditions possibly increases the propensity of migrant workers in workplace unionism (Hartley, 1992). In this regard, one might expect migrant workers to regard unions favorably and to be active in union participation. Furthermore, union service has a close relationship with union participation (Flood, Turner, & Willman, 1996). Becoming a member of unions is seen as attractive in cost-benefit terms (Klandermans, 1984). Like their local counterparts, migrant workers face challenges in protecting their interests, which is possibly the major instrumental concern they can benefit with union service. The extent to which unions are perceived to fulfill their core function in standing for their members is likely to have a strong impact on the attraction of union membership (Turner, Cross, & O'Sullivan, 2014). The perceptions of union support constitute a source for potential mobilization among migrant workers (Metochi, 2012). What's more, unions may be more sympathetic to immigrants with similar culture background to the indigenous population (Marino et al., 2015).

For migrant workers, involvement into trade unions is considered as an important aspect of social inclusion (Penninx, 2005). As actors in the labor market regulatory framework, unions impact socio-economic decision-making, and their standpoints are likely to affect the position of migrant workers within the labor market and within society (Marino et al., 2015). A strong linking of migrant workers with trade unions is critical for their representation in the political process of decision-making on labor market regulations. Conversely, a lack of representation results in a lack of recognition within decision-making processes of the needs of them (International Organization for Migration, 2015). Migrant workers suffer disproportionately from a variety of forms of social exclusion in receiving society. This exclusion is visible in the labor market, and can be witnessed in all spheres of political life as well (Fangen, Brit, & Erlend, 2010). As non-citizens, they possess fewer rights than local workers and cannot vote for representatives who are involved in making policy (Hayduk, 2015). The involvement into trade unions is one of the crucial steps to realize equal rights between local workers and migrant workers. It means that immigrants, like local workers, can also have an impact on policy-making and, to some extent, make the policy voice their need. Ultimately, any full inclusion of migrant workers in the labor market necessitates equal rights as local workers. As unions are organizations standing for the interests of workers, becoming a member of a union is a vital component of this inclusion. It also offers this group of workers a chance to make contributions to advance the common interests of the whole workforce.

Method

Measurement

The data is drawn from wider quantitative research aimed at investigating the working condition of employees in urban areas after the Labor Contract Law went into effect. The questionnaire includes, among other things, a number of items concerning trade union participation (including being a member and activity participation), trust in trade unions, labor dispute experience, as well as various socio-demographic characteristics such as age, gender, education level, employment status, and Hukou which allows for the identification of rural migrant workers. Hukou is a geographic membership entitled to individual by Chinese huji regime (family registering system). There are two

types of this membership, rural residents and urban residents. Those working in urban areas with hukou of rural residents are rural migrant workers (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011).

Procedure

The survey was conducted in ten geographically and economically dispersed Chinese cities: Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Nanjing, Changsha, Chengdu, Wenzhou, Xiamen, Mianyang and Changchun. Geographically, Chengdu and Mianyang are located in the western China, while Shanghai, Nanjing and Wenzhou are in the eastern. Two northern cities, Changchun and Tianjin, were selected along with Shenzhen and Xiamen which are both southern cities. Finally, Changsha was included in this survey because of its location in the central part of the country. Economically, these cities were selected based on the gross domestic product. Three groups were defined as followed. The high level refers to the cities with the GDP above RMB 700 billion, the middle level between RMB 700 billion and 300 billion and the low level, below RMB 300 billion. Among these ten sample cities, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Tianjin are in the high level, Chengdu, Nanjing, Changsha and Changchun in the middle and Mianyang, Wenzhou and Xiamen in the low.

In all ten cities, participants of this survey had to answer a screening question listed in the questionnaire to be eligible. Civil servants, teachers, news reporters, lawyers, self-employed workers and those working for marketing research firms or media firms were excluded from this survey. The interviews lasted from 60 to 90 minutes and were conducted by trained interviewers. The response rate for the survey was 90.0 percent. The survey data contains 1800 respondents, 823 of which were migrant workers.

Dependent variables

This study focuses on two dimensions of trade union participation. The first one is associational dimension, considered here mainly in term of organizational membership. The second one is behavioral dimension with its focus on activity participation. This is to provide more insight on union participation, as having a membership does not necessarily mean that one will participate in trade union's activities. Thus, respondents of this survey had to mention whether or not they were members of trade unions. It was also asked whether they participated in activities arranged by trade unions. Two logistic regression models were constructed, in which organizational membership and activity participation

served as dependent variables respectively.

Independent variables

This study sees the union participation of Chinese rural migrant workers as being influenced by three sets of factors: (1) their experiences in labor disputes (e.g. labor disputes, nonpayment of wage); (2) their employment characteristics (e.g. the size of firm, industry, sector, occupation, job change, duration of employment with current employer and labor contract signing); and (3) their socio-demographic characteristics (e.g. gender, marriage status, age and educational level).

First, this study looks at the experiences in labor disputes. With experience in labor disputes, migrant workers are likely to realize that developing strong workplace unionism or collective action is good for protecting their interests. Among labor disputes that can have an effect on the union participation of migrants, nonpayment of wage are surely an indispensable one. Nonpayment of wage is a serious problem among rural migrant workers and it is tough for them to collect unpaid wages. Given that earning higher income is mostly the primary purpose for rural-to-urban migration in China, the experience rural migrant workers have in nonpayment of wage possibly makes them more aware of the limit of individual effort in negotiating with employer and attach more importance to collective effort and trade unions.

Secondly, employment characteristics of migrant workers should also be taken into account, as they can have an effect on workers' involvement of trade unions. In this article, the focus is on the size of firm, industry, sector, occupation, job change, duration of employment with current employer and labor contract signing. Traditionally, unions have a good coverage on the public sector and they now are struggling to expand to private sector. In this regard, particular sectors may play an important role in union participation. In addition, mobility is one of the factors that hinder union participation of rural migrant workers (Lan, 2006; Cao, 2008). In order to test this hypothesis, this study takes job change and length of employment with current employer into account. Besides, in order for migrant workers to become formal workers of the firm they are working for, signing labor contract is arguably the key step. Without this contract, the relationship between migrant workers and firms is weak and full of uncertainty, and they may not be regarded as eligible members of unions.

Thirdly, one needs to consider the social origin of migrant workers and specific socio-demographic characteristics that may facilitate or impede them from participating in unions. This study focuses on five social aspects of migrants: gender, age, marital status, and education level. In particular, the gender gap in union participation is found in many literatures (Ntuli, 2012). By involving gender into regression model, this study tries to find out whether this is also the case in China.

Control variables

In addition to these three sets of factors, this study also includes in regression model a control variable: the willingness to participate. Motivation is a basic starting point in analyzing one's behavior. A low willingness could hinder an individual from mobilizing himself or herself actively in certain behavior. With respect to union participation, a low willingness to participate is likely to lead to lower levels of participation. This study controls for this variable in regression model in order to get an in-depth knowledge of the situation facing rural migrant workers.

Results and Discussion

The data shows that union membership among the 823 migrant worker respondents is very low, standing at just 9.6%, and only 9.0%, have ever participated trade unions' activities. Furthermore, descriptive statistics show that organizational trust in trade unions is lower than that in court or in the department of labor. When migrant workers encounter labor disputes, trade unions are not the first organizations that they would go to for help. In other words, migrant workers do not perceive trade unionism to be the most viable route to the realization of their interests. This individual perspective is likely to undermine migrant workers' desire to become union members or participate in unions' activities.

Two binary logistic regression models of trade union participation of rural migrant workers were carried out. Table 1 shows the result of these models. In the first model, organizational membership serves as dependent variables. In the second model, the dependent variable is activity participation.

Interestingly, labor disputes do not play their role in union participation for rural migrant workers totally as they are expected to. Controlling for employment characteristics and socio-demographic characteristics, migrants who have ever suffered

from nonpayment of wage are more likely to engage in union activity participation than who have not. But at the same time, neither labor disputes nor nonpayment of wage appear to have a significant impact on the associational aspect of union participation of rural migrant workers. These experiences do not serve as a factor to significantly promote rural migrant workers' union membership. This is also the case for the impact of labor dispute on activity participation.

Concerning employment characteristics, the most impressive result is related to the sectors. Migrants working at private firms are less likely to engage in unions than migrants working at state-owned firms. This holds for both organizational membership and activity participation. These results can be possibly explained by the union distribution among different sectors in China, where unions are traditionally concentrated in public sector, while the private sector, with its short history beginning only in 1980s, has a low level of unionism. Union presence is a determining factor of the joining behavior of workers (Corneo, 1995). It is difficult for rural migrant workers to establish their own independent unions with legal status. In order to become union members, they have no choice but to join an existing union. Having a long history in state-owned firms, unions are usually available for rural migrant workers in this sector. For the migrants working in firms with unions, the unionization rate is as high as 93.3% in 2010 (ACFTU, 2011b). But this is not the case in private firms. In 2010, there were only 824,000 trade unions out of 4.68 million private firms across the country (ACFTU, 2011a; National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011). A large number of private firms do not have their own unions and, thus, no opportunity within these firms to offer to rural migrant workers for joining unions.

Meanwhile, migrant workers in manager positions have a higher probability than those in production and service to participate in unions, in both the associational and behavioral dimensions. This is also the case for those with employment contracts versus those without. Rural migrant workers in production and service occupations and those without labor contracts are less likely to engage in unions. Occupation and employment status may intersect with each other, further disadvantaging certain groups of rural migrants working from union participation, notably frontline workers in production and service without employment contract. Despite the fact that all the rural migrant workers

Table 1. Logistic regression model of trade union participation for rural migrant workers (N=823)

	Organizational membership		Activity participation	
	B	SE	B	SE
<i>Labor disputes experience</i>				
Labor disputes (ref. no such experience)	0.621	0.425	0.564	0.478
Nonpayment of wage (ref. no such experience)	0.868	0.682	1.138*	0.656
<i>Employment characteristics</i>				
Size of firm (ref. <300 employees)				
300-1000	-0.546	0.486	-0.839	0.551
1001+	0.541	0.393	0.190	0.416
Industry (ref. construction and manufacturing)				
Trade	-0.675	0.502	0.032	0.474
Service	-0.136	0.363	-0.199	0.367
Sector (ref. state-owned firms)				
Private firms	-0.970**	0.423	-1.085**	0.454
Foreign-invested firms	-0.311	0.535	-0.383	0.567
Occupation (ref. managers)				
Technical	-0.424	0.531	-0.216	0.523
Sales	-0.012	0.490	-0.915*	0.509
Administrative and secretarial	0.227	0.626	-0.611	0.597

Production and service	-1.048**	0.464	-1.077**	0.457
Duration of employment with current employers (ref. <5 years)				
5+	-0.171	0.415	0.452	0.413
Job change (ref. 0)				
1	-0.029	0.452	0.268	0.477
2+	-0.623	0.386	0.026	0.404
Employment contract (ref. no employment contract)	1.654***	0.441	1.400***	0.420
<i>Socio-demographic characteristics</i>				
Female (ref. male)	0.542	0.346	-0.717**	0.333
Married (ref. not married)	-0.009	0.428	0.383	0.404
Age 30+ (ref. <30)	0.236	0.568	0.166	0.508
Education level (ref. middle school diploma or below)				
High school diploma	0.162	0.407	0.082	0.467
College certificate	-0.621	0.499	1.027**	0.477
University degree	-0.040	0.529	1.214**	0.558
Constant	-3.642***	0.930	-2.942***	0.895
R-squared		0.273		0.232

Notes: Regression models control for the willingness to participating. * = $p \leq .1$; ** = $p \leq .05$; *** = $p \leq .01$.

are granted the right to join unions, inequality within this group of labor force does exist. Among the factors in employment characteristics, occupation and employment status are two significant sources of discrimination in union participation.

Industry, however, does not impact the associational, nor the behavioral aspects of trade union participation. Neither does the size of the firm. What's more, while one might be inclined to think that the longer one has served in a firm, the more likely she or he is to be engaged in unions, here find that not to be the case. Finally, job change also does not serve as a factor to significantly hinder or promote rural migrant workers' union participation. This indicates that mobility does not seem to have an effect as supposed.

Socio-demographic characteristics do not seem to have an important impact on the union participation of migrant workers. Only gender and education level have a significant impact on the probability of activity participation, but no effect on the organizational membership at the same time. Women tend to have a lower possibility of participating union activities, whereas well-educated immigrants are more likely to engage in unions' activities. All the other indicators of socio-demographic characteristics are statistically not significant in these two regression models.

Conclusion

This study presents parts of the results of a survey carried in ten geographically and economically dispersed cities of China. The data consists of a sample of rural migrant workers. By including both associational (organizational membership) and behavioral (activity participation) aspects of union participation, this study tried to develop a deeper understanding of the challenges facing Chinese rural migrant workers in their involvement in trade unions.

With regards to the interest of this study, it is found that along with a low overall level of union membership density, only a very small percentage of members of rural migrant workers have participated in unions' activities. This activity participation varies substantially between male and female immigrants, while well-educated immigrants have a higher probability of participating. Overall, findings of this study show that rural migrant workers do not appear to have a high level of union participation, as had expected taking into account of the labor market position of this group and the effort Chinese unions made in recruitment among them. These findings suggest that the low

level of union participation in rural migrant workers can be viewed as the result of a number of barriers that rural migrant workers face in seeking to become union members or join union activities. The first one is the availability of trade unions in the workplace, with the finding that migrant workers in state-owned firms have a much higher probability of participating unions than those in private firms, where unions' presence is relatively weak. The difficulties for Chinese workers in establishing legal trade unions by themselves worsen this situation. With the resistance from employers, the top-down way in union establishment can take much longer. This is the result in that there are institutional barriers and not enough access for migrant workers to engage themselves into unions. Secondly, discrimination based on occupation and employment status within workplaces hinders rural migrant workers from joining unions. The result for the control for the willingness to participate in regression models indicates that migrants who are working in production and service occupations are less likely to engage in unions, along with those without employment contracts. Workers with certain favorable attributes, working as managers or having employment contracts, have more access to unions. Thirdly, the organizational trust on trade unions is relatively low among Chinese migrant workers. Even after having suffered from labor dispute or nonpayment of wage, they do not appear to be more likely to become union members. The attitude of Chinese workers toward unions influences significantly their union participation (Chan et al., 2006). Rural migrant workers' perceptions about the role that trade unions play may impede their union involvement.

All three of these obstacles are likely to relate to the close relationship that unions have with the government. With this relationship, the government may want to keep unions under control and, as a consequence, limit the development of independent unions established in a bottom-up way. Meanwhile, this relationship possibly makes unions prefer to recruit workers with low risk to have a conflict with employers, e.g. workers at manager occupation and those with employment contracts. Additionally, in the interests of the government with a desire to settle all labor disputes in a peaceful way and in bid of foreign investments, unions may fail to take an active role in workers' collective action, which will undermine their reputation and, in the finding, organizational trust among workers.

What is highly important for us to recognize here is that the involvement of migrant workers into trade unions is under the conditions set by receiving societies. Union policies towards migrant workers are influenced by contextual aspects such as public discourse, legislation and institutional actors like national authorities (Marino et al., 2015). Particularly, the government in developing countries may engage in a “race-to-the-bottom” game. In other words, these governments are likely to prefer to hinder a strong workplace unionism, in order to keep a low labor cost and attract the inflow of investment, which can create jobs and taxes. Facing competition from other Asian countries with cheap labor forces, such as Vietnam or India, the Chinese government is under pressure to raise the level of labor protection. A strong unionism may undermine Chinese “world’s factory” status which relied, to a large extent, on the low cost of labor over the last three decades. Some firms, including many Chinese domestic firms, have already relocated their factories to other countries, after the implementation of the Labor Contract Law, which is generally supposed to raise the labor cost in China. In that sense, the competition between developing countries is likely to maintain the propensity of Chinese government, especially the local government which also faces internal competition, in an effort to keep trade unions under control and restrict their role in collective action.

References

- ACFTU (2011a). *Statistical Communiqué on the 2010 Trade Union Organization and Trade Union Work Development*. Available (consulted May 2016) at: <http://stats.acftu.org/upload/files/1340606734198.pdf>
- ACFTU (2011b). *Chinese Trade Union Statistics Yearbook 2011*. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
- Allen, V. (1966). *Militant Trade Unionism*. London: Merlin.
- Arango, J., Bonifazi, C., Finotelli, C., & Peixotp. J. (2009). *The Making of an Immigration Model: Inflows, Impacts and Policies in Southern Europe*, IDEA Working Paper 9, IDEA, Warsaw, Poland.
- Behrens, M., Hamann, K., & Hurd, R. (2004). Conceptualizing labor union revitalization. In: Frege, C. & Kelly, J. (eds) *Varieties of Unionism: Strategies for Union Revitalization in a Globalizing Economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 11-30.

- Cao, Y. (2008) Analysis of the reasons and countermeasures for migrant rural workers' not joining in trade union. *Journal of Wuhan University of Technology (Social Sciences Edition)* (6): 835-40.
- Chan, A., Feng, T., Redman, T., & Snap, E. (2006). Union commitment and participation in the Chinese context. *Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society* 45 (3): 485-90.
- Cook, F. L. (2015). Labor market disparities and inequalities. In Sheldon, F., Kim, S., Li, Y., & Warner, M. (eds) *China's Changing Workplace: Dynamism, Diversity and Disparity*. New York: Routledge.
- Corneo, G. (1995). Social custom, management opposition and trade union membership. *European Economic Review* 39: 275-92.
- Freeman, R. B., & Medoff, J. L. (1984). *What do unions do?*. New York: Basic Books.
- Frenkel, S. & Sydow, J. (2015). Institutional conditions for global production networks. In: Sheldon, P., Kim, S., Li, Y., & Warner, M. (eds) *China's Changing Workplace: Dynamism, Diversity and Disparity*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Gallagher, M. & Dong, B. (2011). Legislating harmony: labor law reform in contemporary China. In: Lynk, M. (Ed) *Globalization and the Future of Labor Law*. New York: Cornell University Press, 36-60.
- Ge, Y. (2014). Do Chinese unions have 'real' effects on employee compensation?. *Contemporary Economic Policy* 32(1):187-202.
- Hodder, A. & Edwards, P. (2015). The essence of trade unions: understanding identity, ideology and purpose. *Work Employment & Society*, 29(5): 843-54.
- International Organization for Migrant (2015) *Migrants and Cities: New Partnerships to Manage Mobility*. International Organization for Migration.
- Knight, J. & Yueh, L. (2009). Segmentation or competition in China's urban labor market?. *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 33:79-94.
- Lan, G. (2006). A study on the union involvement of rural migrant workers in state-owned Firms. *Truth Seeking* (6): 53-56.
- Leung, P. (2015). *Labor Activists and the New Working Class in China: Strike Leaders' Struggles*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lin, Y. & Ju, W. (2011). Collective actions push trade union reform in China. In: Melisa,

- S., Edlira, X., & Michael, F. (eds) *Trade Unions and the Global Crisis: Labor's Visions, Strategies and Responses*. International Labor Organization, Geneva.
- Marino, S., Penninx, R., & Rooshlad, J. (2015). Trade unions, immigration and migrants in Europe revisited: Unions' attitudes and actions under new conditions', 3 (1), 1-16.
- Meardi, G. (2007). The Polish plumber in the West Midlands: theoretical and empirical issues. *Review of Sociology* 13(2): 39-56.
- Metochi, M. (2002). The influence of leadership and member attitudes in understanding the nature of union participation. *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 40 (1): 87-111.
- National Bureau of Statistics of China (2011) *China Statistical Yearbook 2011*. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
- National Bureau of Statistics of China (2013) *China Statistical Yearbook 2013*. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
- Ntuli, M. (2012). Investigating the gender gap in South African trade union membership: a decomposition analysis. *South African journal of economics* 80(1): 42-61.
- Pencavel, J. (1971). The demand for union services: an exercise. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 24: 180-90.
- Pulignano, V., Meardi, G., & Doerflinger, N. (2015). Trade unions and labor market dualisation: a comparison of policies and attitudes towards agency and migrant workers in Germany and Belgium. *Work, Employment & Society*, 29(5): 808-25.
- Pun, N. & Smith, C. (2007). Putting transnational labor process in its place: the dormitory labor regime in post-socialist China? *Work, Employment and Society* 21(1): 27-45.
- Solinger, D. J. (2009). *State's Gains, Labor's Losses: China, France and Mexico Choose Global Liaison, 1980-2000*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Turner, T., Cross, C., & O'Sullivan, M. (2014). Does union membership benefit immigrant workers in 'hard times'? *Work, Employment and Society* 56(5): 611-30.
- Wei, X., Dong, Z., & Jin, Z. (2015). Does trade union increase the employment stability of workers?. *Management World* (5): 52-62.