

The Influence of Capital Intensity, Leverage, Profitability, and Corporate Social Responsibility on Tax Avoidance with Firm Size as a Moderating Variable

ABSTRACT

Aims:This research aims to test and analyze capital intensity, leverage, profitability, and corporate social responsibility on tax avoidance with firm size as a moderating variable.

Study design:This research uses a quantitative causality method that relies on secondary data collection originating from the Indonesian Stock Exchange.

Place and Duration of Study:Companies listed on the Jakarta Islamic Index from 2018 to 2022.

Methodology:The sampling method used purposive sampling, so that 80 samples were obtained from 16 suitable companies. The analytical method used in this research is panel data regression analysis carried out with Eviews 12 software.

Results:The research results show that capital intensity, leverage, and profitability influence tax avoidance, while corporate social responsibility **does** not affect tax avoidance. The results of the moderation test show that firm size **does** not moderate the influence of capital intensity, leverage, profitability, and corporate social responsibility on tax avoidance.

Implications:Company managers and tax regulators need to pay attention to factors such as capital intensity, leverage, and profitability in managing and supervising tax avoidance practices.

Keywords: Capital Intensity, Leverage, Profitability, Corporate Social Responsibility, Tax Avoidance

1. INTRODUCTION

Companies tend to carry out tax avoidance as part of their business strategy. Tax avoidance aims to minimize the use of legal techniques by utilizing tax laws(Hadaming & Daito, 2023). Companies engaging in tax avoidance is a risky decision, as they must compete in a global market with lower production costs and higher efficiency, in an increasingly integrated economic system(Choi & Park, 2022). The company assesses that tax avoidance has the potential to reduce profits and the distribution of investment wealth(Chung, Goh, Lee, & Shevlin, 2019).

Many cases of tax avoidance are carried out by conventional companies, so many securities investors look for companies that fall into the Sharia securities category. The Indonesia Stock Exchange launched a stock index that meets sharia criteria under the name Jakarta Islamic Index (JII) to meet the market needs of Sharia securities investors. JII is an internationally recognized stock index and is committed to Sharia principles. JII constituent shares are selected based on certain criteria approved by the Sharia Supervisory Board. The criteria used include ensuring that the selected listing companies do not carry out business activities related to gambling, conventional banking and conventional insurance systems, haram food or drinks, and harmful industries or services.

35

36 Stalker's standards are intended to ensure a high degree of performance and liquidity in the
37 stocks included in the JII constituents. Studies have demonstrated that there are disparities
38 in tax avoidance between companies that follow and those that do not follow sharia law.
39 Sharia companies typically avoid taxes that are higher than conventional
40 companies(Saragih, Siswanto, & Dewi, 2019). Another study found that Islamic
41 investments generally have a lower average market response to corporate tax
42 avoidance(Anggraini, Ayu, Saragih, & Dharsana, 2021).

43

44 JII constituents still engage in tax avoidance behavior even though the Indonesian Stock
45 Exchange has implemented strict regulations. An example of a case where a JII constituent
46 company is indicated to have committed tax evasion is the coal company PT Adaro Energy
47 Tbk which is suspected of committing tax evasion through a transfer pricing mechanism
48 through its subsidiary in Singapore, Coaltrade Services International Pte Ltd(CNBC
49 Indonesia, 2019). Another case of tax evasion occurred at PT. In 2018, SIDO issued a DJP
50 letter which is an indication of efforts to minimize the tax burden by carrying out tax
51 avoidance actions(Fikri & Febriyanto, 2023; Matriyadewi & Noviari, 2020).

52

53 Based on the background above, this research aims to empirically test the factors that
54 influence tax avoidance with the hope of obtaining consistent results through capital
55 intensity, leverage, profitability, corporate social responsibility, and firm size as moderating
56 variables.

57

58 2. MATERIALS AND METHODS

59

60 2.1 Types of research

61 This type of research uses interpretive quantitative research. This study is a causal
62 relationship study. The data collection methods used in this study was secondary. The data
63 analysis method used in this study is panel data regression analysis.

64

65 2.2 Population and Sample

66 The total number of companies registered with JII between 2018 and 2022 is 30. The
67 sample selection method is purposive sampling. Directed sampling is a sampling method
68 that pursues specific goals:

69

Table 1 Sample Selection Criteria

No.	Sample Criteria	Amount
1.	Companies Registered on the Jakarta Islamic Index from 2018 to 2022.	30
2.	Companies listed on the Jakarta Islamic Index do not consistently publish financial reports from 2018 to 2022.	(0)
3.	Companies listed on the Jakarta Islamic Index do not have complete information and data in their financial reports from 2018-2022.	(9)
4	Companies listed on the Jakarta Islamic Index that lost money from 2018-2022.	(5)
Number of samples in this study		16
Total observation data for this research (5 years)		80

70

71 2.3 Operational Definition of Variables

72 The operational definitions of variables are presented in the following table:

73

74

Table 2 Variable Operationalization

Variable	Operational definition	Parameter	Scale
Tax avoidance (Y)	Tax avoidance is an effort to legally avoid taxes that do not violate tax regulations carried out by taxpayers by trying to reduce the amount of tax owed (Pohan, 2013)	$ETR = \frac{\text{tax expense}}{\text{Pre - Tax Income}}$ Source: (Rezki, Achsani, & Sasongko, 2020)	Ratio
Capital Intensity (X1)	Capital Intensity is an investment activity carried out by a company that is associated with investment in the form of fixed assets	$CI = \frac{\text{Total Average Assets}}{\text{Revenue}}$ Source: (Fikri & Febriyanto, 2023)	Ratio
Leverage (X2)	The leverage ratio is measured by the DER proxy, a ratio to assess debt and equity, which is used to determine the total funds provided by creditors to the company (Kasmir, 2018).	$DER = \frac{\text{Total Liabilities}}{\text{Total Equity}}$ Source: (Brigham & Houston, 2014)	Ratio
Profitability (X3)	Profitability is measured by ROE, which is a ratio to measure net profit after tax with own capital	$ROE = \frac{\text{Net Profit}}{\text{Total Equity}}$ Source: (Bambang Riyanto, 2020)	Ratio
Corporate Social Responsibility (X4)	CSR disclosure uses the GRI Standard which reveals 77 indicators (Hamdani & Helmy, 2023)	$CSR_{Dj} = \frac{\sum x_{ij}}{N_j}$ Source: (Hamdani & Helmy, 2023)	Ratio
Firm Size (Z)	Firm Size is the size of the company as reflected in its total assets (Dewi & Merkusiwati, 2023)	Firm Size = Ln (Total Aset) Source: (Dewi & Merkusiwati, 2023)	Ratio

75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

2.4 Data analysis

Data analysis uses panel data, which is a combination of time series data called time series and cross sections called cross data. Panel data regression analysis techniques can be carried out using Eviews software. In this analysis technique, three models can be used, namely pooling regression or common effect, fixed effect, and random effect (Basuki & Prawoto, 2016).

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

3.1 Descriptive statistics

Table 3 Descriptive Statistics

	ETR	CI	DER	ROE	CSR	SIZE
<i>Mean</i>	0.271875	0.504075	0.819500	0.221875	0.387000	27.87500
<i>Max</i>	0.790000	0.804000	3.580000	1.450000	0.900000	33.35000
<i>Min</i>	0.160000	0.005000	0.020000	0.010000	0.090000	13.96000
<i>STAD</i>	0.106677	0.222516	0.830168	0.313938	0.193845	5.745611

87
88
89
90

Table 3 explains that out of a total of 80, all variable mean scores are positive. This illustrates that the mean of each variable shows a high level.

3.2 Estimation of Panel Data Regression Models

91 Panel data regression results based on processed data show the model estimates as
 92 follows:
 93

Table 4 Common Effect Model (CEM)

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.177053	0.034473	5.136031	0.0000
CI	0.203066	0.047280	4.294937	0.0001
DER	0.058762	0.015414	3.812268	0.0003
ROE	-0.149885	0.040068	-3.740725	0.0004
CSR	-0.057980	0.054290	-1.067970	0.2890
R-squared	0.308340	Mean dependent var		0.271875
Adjusted R-squared	0.271451	S.D. dependent var		0.106677
S.E. of regression	0.091054	Akaike info criterion		-1.894261
Sum squared resid	0.621816	Schwarz criterion		-1.745385
Log likelihood	80.77046	Hannan-Quinn criter.		-1.834572
F-statistic	8.358686	Durbin-Watson stat		1.405901
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000012			

94
 95
 96
 97

Table 5 Fixed Effect Model (FEM)

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.379384	0.155571	2.438659	0.0177
CI	-0.075262	0.257611	-0.292156	0.7712
DER	0.028846	0.041101	0.701841	0.4855
ROE	-0.330852	0.182426	-1.813620	0.0747
CSR	-0.051170	0.063324	-0.808062	0.4222

Effects Specification

Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)

R-squared	0.655270	Mean dependent var		0.271875
Adjusted R-squared	0.546106	S.D. dependent var		0.106677
S.E. of regression	0.071870	Akaike info criterion		-2.215596
Sum squared resid	0.309918	Schwarz criterion		-1.620089
Log likelihood	108.6238	Hannan-Quinn criter.		-1.976840
F-statistic	6.002603	Durbin-Watson stat		2.745195
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000			

98
 99
 100

Table 6 Random Effect Model (REM)

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.197968	0.051456	3.847338	0.0002
CI	0.182547	0.075475	2.418623	0.0180
DER	0.047389	0.022564	2.100209	0.0391
ROE	-0.145120	0.061038	-2.377528	0.0200
CSR	-0.063946	0.055542	-1.151293	0.2533

Weighted Statistics

R-squared	0.181730	Mean dependent var		0.118874
Adjusted R-squared	0.138089	S.D. dependent var		0.076554
S.E. of regression	0.071072	Sum squared resid		0.378845
F-statistic	4.164203	Durbin-Watson stat		2.304455
Prob(F-statistic)	0.004232			

101
 102
 103

3.3 Panel Data Regression Model Selection

104 **3.3.1 Test Chow**
105

Table 7 Chow Test Results

Effects Test	Statistic	d.f.	Prob.
Cross-section F	4.025539	(15,60)	0.0001
Cross-section Chi-square	55.706761	15	0.0000

106 Table 7 shows the statistical probability $F < 0.05$, so it can be concluded that H_0 is rejected,
107 which means the most accurate model is FEM.
108

109 **3.3.2 Hausman test**
110

Table 8 Hausman Test Results

Test Summary	Chi-Sq. Statistic	Chi-Sq. d.f.	Prob.
Cross-section random	2.344141	4	0.6727

112 The Hausman test results from Table 8 show that the random cross-section probability is
113 $0.6727 > 0.05$, so the best model is REM, so it requires a third test, namely the Lagrangian
114 Multiplier Test.
115

116 **3.3.3 Lagrangian Multiplier Test**
117

Table 9 Lagrangian Multiplier Test

Null (no rand. effect) Alternative	Cross-section		Period	Both
	One-sided	One-sided	One-sided	
Breusch-Pagan	19.53344 (0.0000)	0.099740 (0.7521)	19.63318 (0.0000)	

119 The results of the Lagrangian Multiplier test show that the Breusch-Pagan Cross-section
120 value is $0.0000 < 0.05$, so the best model is REM.
121

122 The result of selecting the model in this research is REM, because it uses the generalized
123 less square (GLS) method, according to the opinion of Gujarati and Porter (2015), the data
124 in this research do not require classical assumption testing, therefore hypothesis testing can
125 be done directly(Gujarati & Porter, 2015).
126

127 **3.4 Hypothesis testing**

128 The best test result for model selection is REM. Hypothesis testing is carried out with two-
129 equation models, the first is a direct influence test (multiple linear regression), and the
130 second is a moderation test:
131

Table 10 T-Test Results

	BRAKE Model 1		BRAKE Model 2	
	Coefficient	Prob.	Coefficient	Prob.
CI	0.182547	0.0180	-0.790230	0.1177
DER	0.047389	0.0391	0.236862	0.3741
ROE	-0.145120	0.0200	-1.071106	0.1003
CSR	-0.063946	0.2533	0.060172	0.1411
CI_SIZE	-	-	0.028603	0.3203
DER_SIZE	-	-	-0.006042	0.1970
ROE_SIZE	-	-	0.030912	0.1895
CSR_SIZE	-	-	-0.002930	0.7832

132

133 Information:
 134 ETR = Effective Tax Rate, CI = Capital Intensity, DER=*Debt Equity Ratio*(Leverage), ROE = Return On Equity
 135 (Profitability), CSR =*Corporate Social Responsibility*, SIZE = Company Size, CI_SIZE = Interaction of multiplying CI
 136 values with SIZE, DER_SIZE = Interaction of multiplying DER values with SIZE, ROE_SIZE = Interaction of
 137 multiplying ROE values with SIZE, CSR_SIZE = Interaction of multiplying CSR values with SIZE

138 The capital intensity (CI) variable has a probability of $0.0180 < 0.05$ and a regression
 139 coefficient of 0.182547 (positive), which means it has a positive relationship with the ETR
 140 value. This means that capital intensity negatively influences tax avoidance, so the first
 141 hypothesis is rejected.

142
 143 The leverage variable measured by DER has a probability of $0.0391 < 0.05$ and a regression
 144 coefficient of 0.047389 (positive), which means it has a positive relationship with the ETR
 145 value. This means that leverage as measured by DER negatively influences tax avoidance,
 146 so the second hypothesis is rejected.

147
 148 The profitability variable as measured by ROE has a probability value of $0.0200 < 0.05$ and
 149 has a regression coefficient of -0.145120 (negative), which means it has a negative
 150 relationship to the ETR value. This means that profitability as measured by ROE has a
 151 positive influence on tax avoidance, so the third hypothesis is accepted.

152
 153 The corporate social responsibility variable has a probability of $0.2533 > 0.05$, meaning that
 154 CSR do not influence changes in tax avoidance, so the fifth is rejected.

155
 156 The variable CI_SIZE (the interaction of capital intensity with firm size) shows a probability of
 157 $0.3203 > 0.05$, so firm size do not significantly moderate the effect of capital intensity on tax
 158 avoidance, so hypothesis 5 is rejected.

159
 160 The variable DER_SIZE (the interaction of leverage as measured by DER and firm size)
 161 shows a probability value of $0.1970 > 0.05$, so firm size do not significantly moderate the
 162 effect of leverage on tax avoidance, so hypothesis 6 is rejected.

163
 164 The variable ROE_SIZE (the interaction of profitability as measured by ROE with firm size)
 165 shows a probability value of $0.1895 > 0.05$, so firm size do not significantly moderate the
 166 effect of profitability on tax avoidance, so hypothesis 7 is rejected.

167
 168 The CSR_SIZE variable (the interaction of CSR with firm size) shows a probability value of
 169 $0.7832 > 0.05$, so firm size is not able to significantly moderate the influence of CSR on tax
 170 avoidance, so hypothesis 8 is rejected.

171
 172 Table 10 shows the results that the firm size variable is not a moderating variable because
 173 all hypothesis results are rejected. Researchers conducted additional tests by changing the
 174 firm size variable into an independent variable. The following are the test results for the firm
 175 size variable as an independent variable:

176 **Table 11 Firm Size Variable Test Results Become Independent Variables**

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistics	Prob
C	0.527689	0.086823	6.077723	0.0000
SIZE	-0.009177	0.003051	-3.008032	0.00035

177
 178 Based on the test results above, the firm size variable tends to be an independent variable,
 179 not a moderating variable. From the output table, you can see that the SIZE variable has a
 180 probability value of 0.0035, which is smaller than 0.05, with a regression coefficient value of
 181 -0.009177 (negative), this shows that firm size has a positive influence on tax avoidance.
 182 This shows that firm size is more of an independent variable than a moderating variable

183 **3.4.1 The Effect of Capital Intensity on Tax Avoidance**

184 Capital intensity has a negative impact on tax avoidance of JII registered companies. The
185 results show that the higher the capital intensity of a company registered as a JII, the lower
186 the tax avoidance behavior. The results are inconsistent with the hypotheses due to the
187 Sharia principles implemented by JII. From a Sharia perspective, tax avoidance is
188 considered unethical and contrary to Islamic principles. Tax evasion is considered an act
189 that is detrimental to society as a whole and the country as a whole(Duski, 2019). This
190 finding is confirmed by previous **researches** that capital intensity negatively influences tax
191 avoidance(Kalbuana, Widagdo, & Yanti, 2020; Widyastuti, Meutia, & Candrakanta, 2022a).
192 These results do not support research that shows that capital intensity has a positive impact
193 on tax avoidance(Damayanti & Gazali, 2018; Kalbuana et al., 2020; Yustrianthe, 2022;
194 Zuhro & Suwandi, 2023).

195
196 **3.4.2 The Effect of Leverage on Tax Avoidance**

197 Leverage, measured by DER, has a negative impact on tax avoidance. This result shows
198 that the higher the leverage value measured by DER of a JII-registered company, the lower
199 the tax avoidance behavior.The findings are not in line with the hypothesis because,from the
200 Islamic perspective, there are principles that regulate financial agreements, including the use
201 of debt (debt). According to the perspective of Islamic business ethics, the use of leverage
202 must pay attention to Sharia principles, such as not using usury and avoiding risks that
203 cannot be anticipated(Kasdi, 2019). Companies using high leverage to obtain debt funds
204 must ensure that the use of debt is in line with Sharia principles, such as the avoidance of
205 usury. According to the view of sharia and Islamic business ethics, tax avoidance through
206 high leverage is considered dishonesty which is detrimental to society and the state. Islam
207 teaches that business transactions must be carried out with the principles of justice and
208 social awareness, so the practice of tax avoidance is not recommended. The results of this
209 study support previous research that leverage has a negative relationship with tax
210 avoidance(Kalbuana et al., 2020), but do not support **researches** showing that leverage
211 plays no role in tax avoidance(Afrianti, Uzliawat, & Noorida, 2022; Dewanti & Sujana, 2019),
212 and researches showing leverage positively influences tax avoidance(Widyastuti et al.,
213 2022a).

214
215
216 **3.4.3 The Influence of Profitability on Tax Avoidance**

217 Profitability, measured as return on equity, has a positive impact on tax avoidance. That is,
218 the higher the firm's profitability, the more likely the JII firm is to avoid taxes. These results
219 support the hypothesis that highly profitable JII firms tend to avoid taxes. According to
220 agency theory, company managers can have incentives to maximize their wealth, including
221 by avoiding taxes. The findings support research that proves profitability has a positive
222 influence on tax avoidance(Rezki et al., 2020; Widyastuti, Meutia, & Candrakanta, 2022b;
223 Yuniarwati, Ardana, Dewi, & Lin, 2017), but do not support research that shows profitability
224 negatively influences tax avoidance(Anita, Titisari, & Nurlaela, 2020; Dewanti & Sujana,
225 2019).

226
227 **3.4.4 The Influence of Corporate Social Responsibility on Tax Avoidance**

228 The results of the CSR research do not affect tax avoidance so high or low CSR scores have
229 no impact on changes in tax avoidance in companies registered with JII. The research
230 results do not match the hypothesis, because the JII company has compliance and ethics in
231 doing business based on Sharia principles. CSR disclosures that are based on Islamic
232 business ethics and are considered valid must follow the principles of justice and
233 proportionality. The company does not only focus on the financial aspects but also the social
234 and environmental impacts of its business activities.

235

236 CSR disclosures must be honest, transparent, and balanced in describing the company's
237 efforts to fulfill its social obligations(Taufikurohman, Ekawati, & Devi, 2022). According to
238 legitimacy theory, companies maintain positive relationships with the environment and
239 surrounding communities, which will result in a better reputation in the future. Companies
240 that disclose CSR will prevent the company from losing legitimacy from the public(Fahad &
241 Nidheesh, 2020). JII Company seeks to maintain legitimacy in the context of Sharia financial
242 principles and social responsibility. The results of this research are by research that CSR
243 disclosure does not affect tax avoidance (Hamdani & Helmy, 2023), but do not support
244 research stating that CSR disclosure negatively influences tax avoidance(Iwenty &
245 Surjandari, 2022; Susanto & Veronica, 2022).

246 247 **3.4.5 The Effect of Capital Intensity on Tax Avoidance with Firm Size as a moderating** 248 **variable**

249 The research results show that company size does not significantly moderate the impact of
250 capital intensity on JII corporate tax avoidance, so Hypothesis 5 is not valid. Agency theory,
251 which focuses on managerial incentives to optimize personal interests, is not entirely
252 relevant in the context of Shari'a companies. This situation is caused by the background of
253 Sharia companies. The results of this study do not support agency theory, and firm size may
254 affect the relationship between tax avoidance and capital intensity. The results are
255 consistent with previous research: firm size cannot avoid taxes by adjusting capital
256 intensity(Hermanto & Puspita, 2022; Julianty, Ulupui, & Nasution, 2023), but it is not
257 according to research that firm size moderates the relationship between capital intensity and
258 tax avoidance(Putri, 2020).

259 260 **3.4.6 The Effect of Leverage on Tax Avoidance with Firm Size as a moderating** 261 **variable**

262 The research results show that company size does not moderate the impact of leverage on
263 JII corporate tax avoidance measured by DER, so Hypothesis 6 is not valid. This means that
264 high corporate debt levels neither depend on firm size nor affect tax avoidance behavior.
265 According to agency theory, larger companies tend to have better access to external
266 financing. Managers of large companies have more resources and expertise to plan complex
267 tax avoidance strategies. Managers of large corporations have the freedom and opportunity
268 to pursue personal interests rather than shareholder interests. This result contradicts
269 findings that firm size moderates the relationship between debt and tax avoidance(Hermanto
270 & Puspita, 2022; Saputra, Suwandi, & Sushartono, 2020; Suyanto & Kurniawati, 2022).

271 272 **3.4.7 The Effect of Profitability on Tax Avoidance with Firm Size as a moderating** 273 **variable**

274 The research results show that company size does not moderate the impact of profitability
275 measured by ROE on JII corporate tax avoidance, so Hypothesis 7 is not valid. This result is
276 not based on agency theory, according to which the relationship between profitability and tax
277 avoidance is affected by the agency relationship between the principal and the agent.
278 However, in this study, firm size does not affect the extent to which firm profitability affects
279 tax avoidance. These results do not support research showing that firm size enhances
280 profitability against tax avoidance(Dewi & Merkusiwati, 2023).

281 282 **3.4.8 The Influence of Corporate Social Responsibility on Tax Avoidance with Firm** 283 **Size as a moderating variable**

284 The research results show that company size does not moderate the impact of corporate
285 social responsibility on JII corporate tax avoidance, so hypothesis 8 is not valid. The findings
286 indicate that the relationship between firm size and CSR and tax avoidance is not significant
287 and is therefore inconsistent with agency theory. According to legitimacy theory, businesses
288 use CSR as a tool to maintain their social legitimacy in the eyes of their

289 stakeholders(Gabrielle & Toly, 2019). Companies can adopt CSR practices to create a
290 positive perception of their social responsibilities. To maintain their legitimacy, companies
291 avoid tax avoidance as this harms their image in the public eye. Companies are committed
292 to corporate social responsibility regardless of their size or the extent to which they avoid
293 controversial tax practices. These results are inconsistent with research on firm size, which
294 attenuates the effect of CSR on tax avoidance(Hidayat, 2019). This study builds on previous
295 findings that firm size does not attenuate the impact of CSR on tax avoidance(Komara,
296 Kurniawan, & Yonata, 2022).

297
298

299 **4. CONCLUSION**

300

301 The findings show that capital intensity, leverage and profitability have an impact on tax
302 avoidance, while corporate social responsibility has no impact on tax avoidance. The results
303 of the moderation test indicate that firm size does not moderate the effects of capital
304 intensity, leverage, profitability and corporate social responsibility on tax avoidance.
305 Therefore, out of the eight hypotheses, seven hypothesis statements are unproven and only
306 one hypothesis statement is proven.

307

308 **REFERENCES**

309 Afrianti, F., Uzliawat, L., & Noorida, AS (2022). The Effect Of Leverage, Capital Intensity,
310 And Sales Growth On Tax Avoidance With Independent Commissioners As Moderating
311 Variables (Empirical Study On Manufacturing Companies Listed On The Indonesia Stock
312 Exchange In 2017-2020). *International Journal of Science, Technology & Management*, 3(2),
313 337–348. <https://doi.org/10.46729/ijstm.v3i2.441>

314 Ang, R. (2010). *Indonesian Capital Market Smart Book*. Jakarta: Mediasoft Indonesia.

315 Anggraini, P., Ayu, P., Saragih, A., & Dharsana, M. (2021). Do Sharia and Non-Sharia
316 Listing Securities Investors Respond Differently To Tax Avoidance? *Indonesian Journal of*
317 *Accounting and Finance*, 18(1), 33–54. <https://doi.org/10.21002/jaki.2021.03>

318 Anita, ED, Titisari, KH, & Nurlaela, S. (2020). Determinants of Tax Avoidance in the
319 Consumer Goods Industry 2014-2018. *Economics: Journal of Economics and Business*,
320 4(1), 48–55. <https://doi.org/10.33087/economics.v4i1.98>

321 Armstrong, C.S., Blouin, J.L., Jagolinzer, A.D., & Larcker, D.F. (2015). Corporate
322 governance, incentives, and tax avoidance. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 60(1), 1–
323 17. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.02.003>

324 Arruda, G. M., & Johannsdottir, L. (2022). *Corporate Social Responsibility in the Arctic The*
325 *New Frontiers of Business, Management, and Enterprise*. London and New York: Routledge.

326 Brigham, E.F., & Daves, P.R. (2018). *Intermediate Financial Management*. United States of
327 America: South Western Educational Publishing.

328 Brigham, E. F., & Ehrhardt, M. C. (2019). *Financial Management: Theory & Practice (Vol.*
329 *46)*. Boston, MA: Cengage Learning.

330 Brigham, E.F., & Houston, J.F. (2019). *Fundamentals of Financial Management 15 Edition*.
331 USA: Cengage Learning.

- 332 Buana, V., & Nuzula, N. (2017). The Effect of Environmental Costs on Profitability and
333 Company Value (Study of First Section Chemical Companies Listed on the Japan Exchange
334 Group for the 2013-2015 Period). *Brawijaya University Undergraduate Business
335 Administration Journal*, 50(1), 10.
- 336 Choi, J., & Park, H. (2022). Tax Avoidance, Tax Risk, and Corporate Governance: Evidence
337 from Korea. *Sustainability (Switzerland)*, 14(1). <https://doi.org/10.3390/su14010469>
- 338 Chung, S.G., Goh, B.W., Lee, J., & Shevlin, T. (2019). Corporate Tax Aggressiveness and
339 Insider Trading. *Contemporary Accounting Research*, 36(1), 230–258.
340 <https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12422>
- 341 CNBC Indonesia. (2019). Regarding Adaro Tax, Sri Mulyani: So far it has been transparent.
342 Retrieved October 21, 2023, from [https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/market/20190708190803-
343 17-83487/soal-pajak-adaro-sri-mulyani-panjang-ini-lalu-transparan](https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/market/20190708190803-17-83487/soal-pajak-adaro-sri-mulyani-panjang-ini-lalu-transparan)
- 344 Damayanti, T., & Gazali, M. (2018). The Influence of Capital Intensity Ratio and Inventory
345 Intensity Ratio on Effective Tax Rate. *4th National Scholars Seminar*, 1(1), 1237–1242.
- 346 Dewanti, IGADC, & Sujana, IK (2019). The Influence of Company Size, Corporate Social
347 Responsibility, Profitability and Leverage on Tax Avoidance. *Udayana University Accounting
348 E-Journal*, 28(1), 377–406.
- 349 Dewi, NKK, & Merkusiwati, NKLA (2023). Company Size Moderates the Effect of Profitability
350 and Capital Intensity on Tax Avoidance. *Udayana Accounting E-Journal*, 33(8), 2145–2159.
351 <https://doi.org/10.24843/EJA.2023.v33.i08.p13>
- 352 Duski, I. (2019). *Al-Qawa'id Al-Maqashidiyah (MAqashid rules)*. Yogyakarta: Ar-Ruzz Media.
- 353 Dyreng, S. D., Hanlon, M., & Maydew, E. L. (2010). The effects of executives on corporate
354 tax avoidance. *Accounting Review*, 85(4), 1163–1189.
355 <https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2010.85.4.1163>
- 356 Elkington, J. (1998). *Cannibals With Forks: The Triple Bottom Line of 21st Century Business*.
357 United Kingdom: New Society Publishers.
- 358 Fahad, P., & Nidheesh, K. B. (2020). Determinants of CSR disclosure: an evidence from
359 India. *Journal of Indian Business Research*, 13(1), 110–133. [https://doi.org/10.1108/JIBR-
360 06-2018-0171](https://doi.org/10.1108/JIBR-06-2018-0171)
- 361 Fikri, MI, & Febriyanto, FC (2023). The Influence of Earning Opacity, Ownership Structure,
362 and Capital Intensity on Tax Avoidance (Empirical Study of Health Sector Companies in the
363 Pharmaceutical Sub Sector Listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange for the 2017-2021
364 Period). *Barelang Accounting Journal*, 7(2), 48–66. <https://doi.org/10.33884/jab.v7i2.7153>
- 365 Gabrielle, G., & Toly, A. A. (2019). The Effect Of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Disclosure
366 And Environmental Performance On Firm Value: Indonesia Evidence. *Scientific Journal of
367 Accounting and Business*, 14(1), 106–119. <https://doi.org/10.24843/jiab.2019.v14.i01.p10>
- 368 Gebhart, M. S. (2017). Measuring Corporate Tax Avoidance – An Analysis of Different
369 Measures. *Junior Management Science journal*, 2(2), 43–60.

- 370 Gujarati, D. N., & Porter, D. C. (2015). *Fundamentals of Econometrics (5th Edition Bu)*.
371 Jakarta: Salemba Empat.
- 372 Hadaming, S. F., & Daito, A. (2023). Leverage, Company Size, and Audit Quality Effect on
373 Tax Avoidance in Manufacturing Companies Listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange and
374 Malaysia Exchange for the 2015-2019 Period. *Journal of Accounting and Financial
375 Management*, 3(6), 274–284. <https://doi.org/10.38035/jafm.v3i6.167>
- 376 Hamdani, R., & Helmy, H. (2023). The Influence of Corporate Social Responsibility on Tax
377 Avoidance with Institutional Ownership as Moderation. *Journal of Exploratory Accounting
378 (JEA)*, 5(3), 1192–1205.
- 379 Hanlon, M., & Heitzman, S. (2010). A review of tax research. *Journal of Accounting and
380 Economics*, 50(2–3), 127–178. <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JACCECO.2010.09.002>
- 381 Hasibuan, MSP (2015). *Banking Basics*. Jakarta: Bumi Literacy.
- 382 Hermanto, & Puspita, I. (2022). The influence of inventory turnover, Capital Intensity, and
383 Leverage on Tax Avoidance with company size as a moderating variable. *Fair Value:
384 Scientific Journal of Accounting and Finance*, 5(2), 1186–1194.
385 <https://doi.org/10.46306/rev.v3i2.156>
- 386 Henry. (2016). *Financial Report Analysis*. Jakarta: Grasindo.
- 387 Hidayat, OS (2019). The Influence of Corporate Social Responsibility on Tax Avoidance with
388 Size as a Moderating Variable. *Indonesian Journal of Accounting, Finance and Taxation*,
389 7(1), 31–43.
- 390 Idowu, SO, Frederiksen, CS, Mermod, AY, & Nielsen, MEJ (2015). *Corporate Social
391 Responsibility and Governance: Theory and Practice*. New York: Springer International
392 Publishing.
- 393 Iwanty, KI, & Surjandari, DA (2022). The Effect of Sales Growth, Responsibility, and
394 Institutional Ownership on Tax Avoidance with Profitability as Moderating Variables. *Journal
395 of Economics, Finance and Accounting Studies*, 4(1), 423–436.
396 <https://doi.org/10.32996/jefas.2022.4.1.26>
- 397 Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
398 Costs and Ownership Structure. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 3(4), 305–360.
- 399 Julianty, I., Ulupui, GKA, & Nasution, H. (2023). The Influence of Financial Distress and
400 Capital Intensity on Tax Avoidance with Company Size as a Moderation. *Journal of
401 Information, Taxation, Accounting, and Public Finance*, 18(2), 259–282.
- 402 Kalbuana, N., Widagdo, RA, & Yanti, DR (2020). The Influence of Capital Intensity,
403 Company Size, and Leverage on Tax Avoidance in Companies Listed on the Jakarta Islamic
404 Index. *Politala Accounting Research Journal*, 3(2), 46–59.
- 405 Kasdi, A. (2019). Actualizations of Maqāṣid Al-shariah In Modern Life; Maqāṣid Al-shariah
406 Theory As a Method of The Development of Islamic Laws and Shariah Economics. *Justicia
407 Islamica*, 16(2), 247–268. <https://doi.org/10.21154/justicia.v16i2.1666>

- 408 Komara, V., Kurniawan, & Yonata, H. (2022). The Influence of Transfer Pricing, Corporate
409 Governance, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), and Capital Intensity on Tax Avoidance
410 with Company Size as a Moderating Variable. *Journal of Citizenship*, 6(2), 4900–4916.
411 Taken from <https://journal.upy.ac.id/index.php/pkn/article/view/4046/pdf>
- 412 Maitriyadewi, NLRP, & Noviri, N. (2020). Profit Management, Profitability and Family
413 Ownership and Tax Avoidance. *Udayana Accounting E-Journal*, 30(6), 1382–1396.
414 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.24843/EJA.2020.v30.i06.p04>
- 415 Mardiasmo. (2018). *Taxation Revised Edition*. Yogyakarta: Andi Offset.
- 416 Mohiuddin, S. K., & Siddiqui, D. A. (2023). The Development of the Maqasid Al Shariah
417 Index to Assess the Sharia Compatibility Performance of Islamic Industry Including Other
418 Industry and Financial Industry & Banks. *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 1–45.
419 <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4432530>
- 420 Noor, H.F. (2014). *Business Financial Management Investment and Community Economic*
421 *Development*. Jakarta: Index.
- 422 Pohan, CA (2013). *Tax Management*. Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka.
- 423 Putri, AA (2020). Tax Avoidance Through Company Size as a Moderating Variable:
424 Institutional Ownership, Capital Intensity and Company Age. *Journal of Business and*
425 *Economics (JBE) UPI YPTK*, 5(1), 1–11. <https://doi.org/10.35134/jbeupiyptk.v5i1.93>
- 426 Rezki, MA, Achsani, NA, & Sasongko, H. (2020). Tax Avoidance: Determinant Factors and
427 Impact on Firm Value. *International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR)*, 9(1), 11–17.
428 <https://doi.org/10.21275/ART20204540>
- 429 Saputra, AW, Suwandi, M., & Sushartono. (2020). The Effect of Leverage and Capital
430 Intensity on Tax Avoidance with Company Size as a moderating variable (Study of Mining
431 Companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2017-2019). *Islamic Accounting and*
432 *Finance Review Volume 1 Number 2 2020.*, 1, 29–47.
- 433 Saragih, HA, Siswanto, D., & Dewi, MK (2019). Tax avoidance among sharia and non-
434 sharia-compliant companies: Evidence from Indonesia. *Accounting: An Indonesian Context*,
435 12, 107–118.
- 436 Sartono, A. (2015). *Financial Management: Theory and Applications*. Yogyakarta: BPFÉ.
- 437 Sujarweni, VW (2015). *Management accounting: theory and application*. Yogyakarta:
438 Pustaka Baru Press.
- 439 Susanto, A., & Veronica, V. (2022). The Influence of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
440 and Company Characteristics on Tax Avoidance Practices of Companies Listed on the
441 Indonesian Stock Exchange. *Owner*, 6(1), 541–553. <https://doi.org/10.33395/owner.v6i1.551>
- 442 Suyanto, & Kurniawati, T. (2022). Profitability, Sales Growth, Leverage, Tax Avoidance:
443 Company Size as a Moderating Variable. *Journal of Applied Management and Finance*
444 *(Mankeu)*, 11(04), 820–832.
- 445 Taufikurohman, R., Ekawati, E., & Devi, Y. (2022). The Influence of Maqashid Syariah
446 Performance and Islamic Social Reporting on Tax Aggressiveness with Company Size as a

- 447 Moderating Variable (Empirical Study of Sharia Banking in Indonesia 2016-2020). Bukhori:
448 Studies in Islamic Economics and Finance, 1(2), 165–180.
449 <https://doi.org/10.35912/bukhori.v1i2.1792>
- 450 Widyastuti, SM, Meutia, I., & Candrakanta, AB (2022a). the Effect of Leverage, Profitability,
451 Capital Intensity and Corporate Governance on Tax Avoidance. Integrated Journal of
452 Business and Economics, 6(1), 13. <https://doi.org/10.33019/ijbe.v6i1.391>
- 453 Widyastuti, SM, Meutia, I., & Candrakanta, AB (2022b). The Impact of Leverage, Profitability,
454 Capital Intensity and Corporate Governance on Tax Avoidance. Indonesian Journal of
455 Business and Entrepreneurship (IJBE), 6(1), 13–27.
- 456 Yuniarwati, Ardana, IC, Dewi, SP, & Lin, C. (2017). Factors That Influence Tax Avoidance in
457 Indonesia Stock Exchange. Chinese Business Review, 16(10), 510–517.
458 <https://doi.org/10.17265/1537-1506/2017.10.005>
- 459 Yustrianthe, RH (2022). Audit Committee, Capital Intensity, Company Size and Tax
460 Avoidance: Empirical Study in Indonesia. Dewantara Accounting, 6(1), 43–57.
- 461 Zuhro, S., & Suwandi, S. (2023). Effect of Capital Intensity on Tax Avoidance: The
462 Moderating Role of Corporate Social Responsibility. Journal of the Muhammadiyah
463 University of Gresik Engineering, Social Science, and Health International Conference
464 (UMGESHC), 2(1), 113. <https://doi.org/10.30587/umgeshc.v2i1.5113>
- 465