

ANALYSIS OF TRADE EFFECTS OF PARALLEL EXCHANGE RATE IN NIGERIA

ABSTRACT

Aims: The study examines the potency of parallel exchange rates in the movement of international trade in Nigeria. The monetary authorities have embarked on various exchange rate regimes basically because the supply of foreign exchange is not enough to meet the demand. Consequently, a parallel market for exchange rates exists and has become a strong and functional market in the country. But the reason for managing foreign exchange and by extension, introducing various exchange rate regimes was to correct the balance of trade disequilibrium. Yet the balance of trade deteriorates, particularly that of non-oil trade balance. Does the parallel exchange rate contribute to this or does it ameliorate it?

Study design: Descriptive, Correlation, and Regression analysis on time series data

Place and Duration of Study: Sample: Monthly data from January 2007 to December 2022 (2007:1-2022:12) were extracted from the online data repository of the Central Bank of Nigeria..

Methodology: The autoregressive distributed lag technique was employed on monthly data between January 2007 and December 2022 (2007:1-2022:12).

Results: The result indicates that the short-run dynamics of total exports (total imports) are negatively (positively) and significantly affected by parallel exchange rate. Generally, depreciation of the parallel exchange rate is detrimental to export particularly non-oil exports. Further, depreciation of parallel exchange rate encourages imports and highly persistent in influencing non-oil imports. The J-curve phenomenon breaks down for total balance of trade. However, the J-curve phenomenon cannot be confirmed in the case of oil trade balance because there is no information about the long run effect of parallel exchange rate on oil export due to the non-integration of the model. In the case of non-oil trade balance, the short-run outcome confirms the existence of the J-curve prediction.

Conclusion: Following these results, it is recommended among others that government should activate a single market (window) for foreign exchange. Also, the authorities should ensure that importation of non-oil products such as exotic cars by government officials be stemmed.

Keywords: Empirical studies on trade, foreign exchange, monetary policy, trade policy, Econometrics

1. INTRODUCTION

The relationship between exchange rates and trade has been examined variously in both theoretical and empirical studies. In principle, countries with chronic current account deficits, high rates of inflation, and some other weak economic fundamentals may devalue/depreciate the currency. With this, exports increase, and the trade deficit over time is improved. Conversely, a strong domestic currency (in terms of appreciation of currency) hampers exports and makes imports cheaper (Kramer, 2023).

24 The theoretical underpinning of parallel exchange rate and economic performance is
25 established by the portfolio balance, real trade, and monetary approaches. The portfolio
26 balance model considers foreign currency as a financial asset in the financial portfolio.
27 Investors and producers use foreign currency as a hedging instrument due to a loss of
28 confidence in the value of domestic currency owing to high inflation rates and low real
29 interest rates (Bergman (2005). Not only that, the producers also use foreign currency as a
30 means of hoarding imports and as a store of value (Black, 2014). Hence, in the process of
31 changing the composition of investors' and producers' financial portfolios from domestic to
32 foreign currencies, the existence and propagation of parallel exchange rates is established.
33 The validity of this approach has been tested severally by studies like Evans and Lyons
34 (2022); Kallianioti (2021); Adekoya (2020); Tarri and Gozen (2018);

35 The monetary approach follows from the portfolio approach by arguing that too much money
36 in circulation triggers a higher inflation rate and consequently forces economic agents to
37 demand more of foreign exchange (Mogaji, (2018). Owing to foreign exchange control,
38 producers are forced to go to the parallel market to buy foreign currencies. Generally, too
39 much money in circulation leads to excess demand for goods and services, which puts more
40 pressure on the general price level to increase (Kurihara & Fukushima, 2015; Umoru, 2013).
41 In the process, exchange rate will depreciate against the currency of the affected country
42 (Mogaji, 2018).

43 Gray (2021); Ebaidalla (2019); CBN (2016); Siddiki (2008); Agenor (1992) argue that an
44 expected depreciation of the parallel exchange rate will reduce demand for domestic
45 currency, create excess supply, and further depreciate the parallel market exchange rate.
46 Conversely, an expected appreciation in the parallel market exchange rate will lead to an
47 increase in the demand for domestic currency, leading to an acute supply of money and
48 further appreciation of the parallel market exchange rate.

49 The third approach, that is, the real trade model demonstrates that the emergence of parallel
50 market exchange rates is not unconnected with foreign exchange control by the monetary
51 authorities (Melvin & Norrbin, 2023; Onyiruiba, 2016). One such control is when the
52 monetary authorities are trying to prevent external reserve depletion, thereby rationing the
53 supply of foreign currencies (Moses-Ashike, 2023; Gray 2021; Abiola & Adedayo, 2013).
54 The acute supply of foreign currencies will trigger excess demand and this will naturally
55 create a parallel market for foreign exchange (Nwokorie & Nwachukwu 2015). Similarly, the
56 introduction of import tariffs, export taxes, and quotas tend to facilitate smuggling and hence
57 the emergence of a parallel exchange market (Degefa 2001; Kaufmann 1991).
58 Conclusively, the model argues that a parallel market exchange rate occurs due to a
59 mismatch between the demand for and supply of foreign currency. The parallel market
60 exchange rate affects trade through five sources, namely, the smuggling of exported
61 products, and under-invoicing of exports. These two sources will lead to a reduction in
62 reported (official) exports (United Nations [UN], 2002). Other sources are over-invoicing of
63 imports, which will artificially increase the value of official imports, and diversion of foreign
64 currency from the official to the parallel market through corruption.

65 Crookes, Zhang, Stoddart (2022); Gray (2021), Zheng and Tao (2014); BIS (2013); Kiguel
66 and O'Connell (1995), Aron and Elbadawi (1992) argue that the existence of a parallel
67 market for exchange rates (dual foreign exchange) is legal if the purpose is to aid financial
68 transactions, avoid short term effects of depreciation of domestic price while maintaining
69 some degree of control over capital flows and foreign reserves. However, excessive
70 controls on foreign exchange will penalize some intending users in the official exchange rate
71 markets (official and parallel) and naturally encourage and propagate illegal (informal)
72 parallel markets for exchange rates. The market becomes more important as the monetary

73 authorities try to fight the deteriorating balance of payments (BIS 2013; Kiguel and
74 O'Connell, 1995). Consequently, the first channel through which the parallel market feeds
75 into the economy is illegal trade because the parallel market for foreign exchange
76 encourages export diversification from official to unofficial channels and more official imports
77 than unofficial imports (Crookes et al. 2022)

78 The existence of a parallel market exchange rate is said to be dependent on the exchange
79 rate regime practiced by a country in its foreign exchange management (Ajinaja, 2017;
80 Musibau, 2017; Oyovwi, 2013; Adaramola, 2016; Bernadin, 2017 & Nkurunziza, 2002).
81 Specifically, if a government embarks on a fixed or managed floating exchange rate at its
82 official window, there is a high tendency for the parallel market window to open offering rates
83 higher than the official (Oworu et al. 2016). Consequently, the existence of a parallel market
84 where the local currency exchanges for other international currencies at prices different from
85 the official will influence trade performance (Edeme et al. 2017; Ebaidalla 2017)

86 The exchange rate is determined by the supply and demand of foreign exchange. In
87 Nigeria, the supply of exchange rate is mainly from oil proceeds, which in turn, depends on
88 the price of oil (International Trade Administration [ITA] 2022). When oil price increases,
89 foreign exchange also increases, leading to an increase in foreign reserve and hence more
90 supply of foreign exchange. With more supply, pressure on demand for foreign exchange
91 will reduce and there may likely be an appreciation of the local currency against other foreign
92 currencies. Conversely, when the oil price falls, foreign reserves will reduce leading to an
93 acute supply of foreign exchange. With the continuous increase in demand, the pressure on
94 the limited foreign reserve will be high which will lead to the depreciation of the local
95 currency (CBN 2016). Therefore, in a bid to manage foreign exchange, monetary authorities
96 in Nigeria have practiced various types of exchange rate regimes and foreign exchange
97 market systems.

98 In the 1970s through the early 1980s, the fixed exchange rate was practiced. The dual
99 exchange rate system gave birth to the first-tier and second-tier trading platforms in the early
100 1980s. In 1987, the retail Dutch Auction System was adopted. The autonomous exchange
101 rate system was used in 1988, the interbank exchange rate system in 1989, the floating
102 exchange rate in 1992, the crawling peg in 1994, the guided deregulation in 1995, and much
103 later in 2015 the investors and exporters window was adopted. Currently, in 2023, Nigeria
104 has once again adopted the floating rate regime. In all of these regimes, the objective is to
105 stem the demand for foreign exchange and ensure the appreciation of the local currency
106 against foreign currencies (Nkurunziza 2002). However, it is interesting that each of these
107 regimes was met with speculative attacks and illicit exchange rate arbitrageurs which made
108 the parallel foreign exchange market soar (CBN, 2022).

109 For instance, when the Central Bank of Nigeria's official (fixed) exchange rate was N9.87 per
110 dollar in 1991, the parallel market exchange rate was N16.5 per dollar. Also, in 1999, when
111 the official exchange rate rose to N97.6 per dollar, the same dollar was sold for N102.2 at
112 the parallel market. The situation has not been different over time. In fact, in 2015, when
113 the authorities embarked on foreign exchange rationing, giving access to the critical sectors,
114 the students and those seeking foreign medical attention to exchange dollars for N305.2, the
115 price in the parallel market was N462. In 2022, when the official exchange rate was N460.8,
116 the parallel market exchange rate was N690 par dollars. However, there was a
117 harmonization of exchange rates in mid-2023 when both the official and parallel market
118 exchange rates appeared to be at par, posting N770.88 to \$US1.

119 In all, it is evident that deregulation of the official exchange rate leads to appreciation of the
120 parallel market exchange rate thus, resulting in an exchange rate premium in Nigeria. Quite

121 several studies (Ijirshar et al. 2022; Ayomitunde et al. 2020; Dare & Elijah, 2020; Okonkwo,
122 2019; Onakoya& Johnson, 2018; Ibrahim et al. 2017; Igue& Ogunleye, 2014) have examined
123 how official exchange rate affects trade and trade balance in Nigeria, however, the effect of
124 the parallel market exchange rate on trade to a large extent is yet to be explored. The
125 parallel exchange market enjoys a wider patronage from economic agents accounting for a
126 higher percentage of the total foreign exchange transactions in developing countries (Gray
127 2021). As Nigeria adopts the floating exchange regime once again, it is imperative to know
128 how this decision will affect international trade since trade is what brings foreign currency.
129 This analysis is even more important with the reduction in government foreign exchange
130 revenue due to dwindling oil prices (Nwachukwu 2023). Currently, Nigeria runs a deficit
131 budget of about N765.61 billion as at the fourth quarter of 2022 (CBN 2022), with the
132 depletion of foreign reserves from \$39billion in 2015 to \$3.7 billion in August 2023
133 (Nwachukwu, 2023). Although, the economy is beginning to show signs of recovery in the
134 area of trade balance. A trade surplus of N908.9 billion was recorded towards the end of the
135 first quarter of 2023 from a deficit of N617.1 billion recorded in the previous year, attributed
136 to a reduction in imports by 59.8% in 2023. Nevertheless, international, regional, and
137 national economic outlook project Nigeria as a major contributor in the global economic
138 trajectory (Africa Export-Import Bank [AFREXIM BANK] 2023; ITA 2022; CBN 2022), and
139 this is expected to come from the non-oil trading sector.

140 With the current focus of the Nigerian government on the non-oil sector, policymakers,
141 foreign trading partners, investors, and local manufacturers would like to know what this new
142 exchange rate regime offers to trade, especially the non-oil sector. This study offers a novel
143 contribution to the exchange rate and trade literature in Nigeria by disaggregating the trade
144 balance between oil and non-oil imports and exports. The aim is to examine the effects of
145 parallel exchange rates on oil and non-oil imports and exports within the autoregressive
146 distributed lag (ARDL) framework. For analysis, the following questions are asked. First, how
147 does trade (exports and imports) respond to the exchange rate movement in the parallel
148 market? Second, do changes in parallel market exchange rates matter for non-oil trade
149 balance? Third, Can the J-curve phenomenon be validated in the parallel market rate in
150 Nigeria? The rest of this paper is outlined as follows; section 2 is the literature review,
151 section 3 is Data and Methodology, section 4 is the Result and discussion, and section 5
152 concludes the work.

153 154 **2. METHODOLOGY**

155
156 Following the real trade, portfolio, and monetary approach to the parallel market exchange
157 rate effect on trade, export is a reducing function of the parallel market exchange rate while
158 import is an increasing function (Evans and Lyons, 2022; Tarri and Gozen, 2018). Thus, the
159 functional relationship between trade and parallel market exchange rate is specified in
160 equations 1 and 2.

$$161 \quad EXPORT_t = F(PARALLEL, Z_t) \quad 1$$

$$162 \quad IMPORT_t = F(PARALLEL, V_t) \quad 2$$

163
164 Where, EXPORT, IMPORT, PARALLEL, Z, and V represent values of exports, imports,
165 parallel market exchange rate, and other catchall variables that affect exports and imports
166 respectively. The catchall variables considered in this work follow variables in the export and
167 import models. These variables include commercial bank interest rate, foreign direct
168 investment, import coverage, monetary policy rate, and external reserves. The basic
169 regression model to be estimated after incorporating all variables are shown in equations 3
170 and 4,

171 $\ln EXPORT_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln parallel_t + \beta_2 \ln FDI_t + \beta_3 comm_rate_t + \beta_4 \ln CAP_IMP_t +$
 $\beta_5 \ln IMP_COVER_t + \beta_6 \ln RES_t + \mu_t \dots \dots \dots 3$

172 $\ln IMPORT_t = \psi_0 + \psi_1 \ln parallel_t + \psi_2 \ln FDI_t + \psi_3 comm_rate_t + \psi_4 \ln CAP_IMP_t +$
 173 $\psi_5 \ln IMP_COVER_t + \psi_6 \ln RES_t + \mu_t \dots \dots \dots 4$

174 Equations 3 and 4 are the logarithmic transformation of equations 1 and 2 after incorporating
 175 other important variables dimmed to have affected trade but not always featured in previous
 176 studies. FDI is the foreign direct investment, comm_rate is the commercial bank average
 177 interest rate, CAP_IMP is capital importation, IMP_COVER is import cover and RES is the
 178 foreign reserves. Others are parameters to be estimated while is the error term.
 179

180 Expectedly, the parallel exchange rate should affect exports negatively (Ebaidalla 2017;
 181 Munoz 2006). That is, when there is foreign exchange control, pressure on demand for
 182 foreign currency will cause depreciation. The depreciation in parallel exchange rate will
 183 discourage some intending exporters. Further, those who may likely benefit from the official
 184 foreign exchange rationing may over-invoice their goods in order to collect more foreign
 185 currency, whereas very few will be channeled towards exporting while the rest will be meant
 186 for round-tripping (Degefa 2001; Kiguel 1995). Those who could not have enough domestic
 187 currency backing will not benefit from such. In any of these cases, depreciation of parallel
 188 exchange rate is expected to reduce officially reported exports.

189 The converse is the case for imports, that is, in equation 4, ψ_1 is expected to be positive,
 190 increasing imports when parallel market exchange rate depreciates. This implies that trade
 191 balance will worsen in the face of the parallel market exchange rate. Also, import cover
 192 provides incentives to investors/producers when importing important capital goods that will
 193 be useful for production, thus, provided importation of capital goods dominate imports, there
 194 should be a positive effect (Gray 2021; Zhang & Tao 2014; BIS 2013). Albeit, if the structure
 195 of imports is such that final goods dominate, capital goods may not have any significant
 196 positive effect, worse still, may have negative effect. This may be positive or negative. In the
 197 case of commercial bank interest rate, a negative effect on exports and positive effect on
 198 imports is expected (Thi Thanh Tu Tran, 2019; Akpan et al. 2016; Odedokun, 2016).
 199 Reserves is expected to increase importation but may not necessarily affect exports
 200 (Schanz, 2019; Mansaray, 2018; Nteegah&Okpoi, 2017).

201 There are several methods for estimating equations 3 and 4, and this depends on the nature
 202 of the data series and the objectives of the study. The objectives of this study are to examine
 203 the effect of parallel market exchange rate on trade generally, on oil import/export, non-oil
 204 import/export and to validate the J-curve phenomenon in the parallel exchange rate. This
 205 study adopts the autoregressive distributed Lag dynamic model (ARDL). Amongst other
 206 considerations, more importantly is the fact that ARDL is capable of dealing with
 207 endogeneity problem common with financial and economic variables. The J-curve
 208 phenomenon is built on the assumption of a short run to long run relationship which is
 209 already embedded in the ARDL framework.

210 The test for unit root is carried out using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-
 211 Perron (PP) method while the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) method is
 212 employed for the stationarity test. More often than not, when series in equations 3 and 4 are
 213 performed under each of the stated approach, results obtained are almost the same.

214 Consequently, the ADF is specified and reported in this study. The ADF specification is
215 provided in equation 5.

$$\Delta y_t = \beta_t + T_t + \sigma y_{t-1} + \sum_{i=1}^n \beta_i \Delta y_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t \dots \dots \dots 5$$

216
217

218 Where y_t is the series to be tested, β is constant, T_t is trend, and $\sum_{i=1}^n \beta_i \Delta y_{t-1}$ is the
219 augmentation. Its purpose is to allow for any possible data emanating from the
220 autoregressive data-generating process in any order greater than 1. This augmentation is
221 also useful for correcting serial autocorrelation in the stochastic disturbance term, that is, the
222 parameter of interest is; σ_i . The null hypothesis is that $\sigma = 0$ in which case, the series is
223 stationary and the alternative hypothesis is that $\sigma < 0$, which means the series is
224 nonstationary.

225 The study utilizes monthly data on variables which are; total exports, total imports, oil
226 exports, oil imports, non-oil exports, non-oil imports, parallel market exchange rate, foreign
227 direct investment, import cover, capital import, commercial bank average interest rate, and
228 foreign reserves. Monthly data on all the variables, covers January 2007 to December 2022.
229 The period was guided by the availability of monthly data on the variables considered for the
230 work.

231
232 **3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**
233

234 Table 1 highlights the descriptive statistics of the series. On average, export and import
235 posted 17566.28 and 11,438.25 million naira respectively. For non-oil export and non-oil
236 import, the average value was 1095.69 and 8614.83 million naira. The oil export and import
237 recorded a respective average of 14566.92 and 3227.7 million naira. This implies that on
238 average, Nigeria earned 1.09 from non-oil exports while it earned 14.6 billion naira from oil
239 imports. Similarly, the country recorded an average of 8.6 billion non-oil imports and 3.2
240 billion oil imports. Clearly, more foreign exchange was earned from oil exports than non-oil
241 exports while more foreign exchange was spent on non-oil imports than oil imports.
242 Consequently, Nigeria experienced a monthly average of oil trade surplus and non-oil trade
243 deficit. The trade deficit recorded from non-oil could be traced, in part, to the existence of a
244 parallel market exchange rate that may reduce officially reported exports and increase
245 officially reported imports.

246 Parallel exchange rate, capital import, commercial bank interest rate, import cover, FDI,
247 MPR, and external reserves recorded respective average values of 233.47/\$, ₦53,389,837
248 million, 16.80%, ₦10.46,146 million, ₦146,000,000 million, 11.29% and ₦39,072.81 million.
249 Maximum values for export, import, non-oil export, non-oil import, oil import and oil export
250 posted ₦28,236.51; ₦19,856.03; ₦11,315.84; ₦12,826.31; ₦15,113.28; ₦24,235.31 (all
251 million) which corresponds with 2008M07, 2011M08, 2019M11, 2019M03, 2019M10,
252 2008M07 respectively. This means Nigeria had the highest export in July 2008 which is
253 largely informed by oil exports. The maximum values for the parallel exchange rate, capital
254 import, commercial rate, import cover, FDI, MPR and reserve are ₦169.04, 380 million;
255 19.66%, ₦20.83, 653 million, 14.00%, ₦62,081.86 million respectively.

256 Within the sample period, exports, imports, non-oil exports, non-oil imports, oil exports, oil
257 imports, parallel exchange rate, capital imports, commercial bank interest rate, import cover,

258 FDI, MPR and external reserves reached their respective minimum values shown in Table 1
 259 in 2016M02, 2019M10, 2015M09, 2017M01, 2019M10, 2019M09, 2008M06, 2015M03,
 260 2008M11, 2011M11, 2009M08, 2009M07, 2016M10.

261 **Table 1: Descriptive properties of the variables**

Series	Mean	Max	Min	Std. Dev.	Skewness	Kurtosis	J- B	p-value	Obs
EXPORT	17566.28	28236.51	7442.26	5700.05	-0.051	1.76	9.29	0.0096	180
IMPORT	11438.25	19856.03	1348.17	3031.19	-0.007	3.135	0.11	0.946	180
NON_OIL_EXP	1095.69	11315.84	347.72	1494.51	6.004	39.776	8980.25	0.0000	180
NON_OIL_IMP	8614.83	12826.31	5125.03	2142.32	0.107	1.793	9.02	0.0109	180
OIL_EXP	14566.92	24235.31	1604.71	5318.17	-0.087	1.809	8.69	0.0129	180
OIL_IMP	3227.71	15113.28	634.18	2137.28	3.577	19.389	1918.54	0.0000	180
CAP_IMP	53589837	380,000,000	130000.0	66,865,386	2.837	12.022	681.54	0.0000	180
COMM_RATE	16.79	19.66	14.58	1.105	0.529	3.241	7.08	0.0289	180
FDI	146,000,000	653,000,000	995422.0	149,000,000	1.517	4.432	67.56	0.0000	180
IMP_COVER	10.46	20.83	4.43	3.86	0.828	2.955	16.48	0.0003	180
PARALLEL	233.47	494.70	118.70	103.56	0.749	2.049	18.88	0.0000	180
MPR	11.29	14.00	6.00	2.66	-0.88	2.52	20.21	0.0000	180
RES	39072.81	62081.86	23689.87	8729.63	0.585	3.037	8.23	0.0163	180

262 *Note: OIL_EXP, OIL_IMP, CAP_IMP, COM_RATE, FDI, IMP_COVERAGE, PARALLEL, MPR, and RES stand for*
 263 *values of oil export, oil import, capital import, commercial bank interest rate, foreign direct investment, import*
 264 *coverage, parallel market exchange rate, monetary policy rate, and foreign reserves respectively. Values for*
 265 *exports, imports, capital importation, foreign direct investment and foreign reserves are measured in million naira*
 266 *while other variables are measured in percentage, except for the parallel exchange rate which is measured as the*
 267 *quantity of naira per unit of dollar; J-B is the value of Jarque-Bera while p-value is the probability values associated*
 268 *with J-B and Obs is several observations.*

269 The relative stability and volatility in the variables are indicated by the standard deviation
 270 statistic which implies a value closer to 0 is stable and less volatile while a value farther
 271 away from 0 is less stable and more volatile. Table 1 reveals that all the series are not stable
 272 and relatively volatile, albeit, at varied degrees. For instance, commercial bank rate has the
 273 lowest volatility followed by import cover as indicated by their respective values of 1.10 and
 274 3.86.

275 The skewness and kurtosis statistic which provides first-hand information about the normality
 276 of the series shows that the non-oil export, non-oil import, parallel exchange rate, capital
 277 import, commercial rate, import cover, FDI, MPR and external reserves are positively
 278 skewed since their respective value is greater than zero. However, total exports, oil exports
 279 and monetary policy rate are negatively skewed with values -0.05, -0.007, -0.087, and -0.88
 280 respectively. The kurtosis statistic with a threshold of 3 shows that import, non-oil export, oil
 281 export, capital import, commercial rate, FDI, and reserve are leptokurtic (highly peaked)
 282 since their values are greater than 3, while export, non-oil import, oil export, import cover,
 283 parallel exchange rate are platykurtic. However, inference cannot be made based on single
 284 consideration of skewness and kurtosis for stability purposes, however, the Jarque-Bera

IMPORT	0.53	1											
NON_OIL EXP	-0.06	-0.25	1										
NON_OIL IMP	0.33	0.80	0.13	1									
OIL EXP	0.97	0.56	-0.24	0.26	1								
OIL_MP	0.36	0.13	0.77	0.23	0.19	1							
CAP IMP	-0.01	-0.05	0.29	0.16	-0.09	0.22	1						
COMM RATE	-0.28	-0.26	-0.29	-0.36	-0.21	-0.33	0.01	1					
FDI	0.12	-0.11	-0.12	-0.14	0.14	-0.09	0.03	-0.12	1				
IMP COVER	-0.15	-0.61	-0.11	-0.64	-0.12	-0.34	-0.09	0.15	0.38	1			
MPR	-0.33	-0.06	0.23	0.04	-0.39	0.07	0.05	-0.25	-0.14	-0.09	1		
PARALLEL	-0.67	-0.39	0.26	-0.26	-0.71	-0.06	0.09	0.03	-0.32	0.02	0.48	1	
RES	0.41	-0.11	0.01	-0.15	0.40	-0.01	0.04	-0.19	0.46	0.57	-0.18	-0.39	1

323 Note: OIL_EXP, OIL_IMP, CAP_IMP, COM_RATE, FDI, IMP_COVERAGE, PARALLEL, MPR, and RES stand for
324 oil export, oil import, capital import, commercial bank interest rate, foreign direct investment, import coverage,
325 parallel market exchange rate, monetary policy rate, and foreign reserves respectively.

326 Table 3 shows the result of unit root tests conducted through the augmented Dickey-Fuller
327 test. The series exhibits diverse levels at which they are stationary. As can be observed, oil
328 and non-oil exports, commercial banks interest rate, monetary policy interest rate and
329 parallel exchange rate are stationary at first difference while other series are stationary at
330 levels. This confirms the justification for employing autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) for
331 the models since the series exhibit a combination of levels of integrations, that is, I(0) and
332 I(1).

333 **Table 3: ADF Unit root test of the variables**

Variables	LEVEL				FIRST DIFFERENCE			I(d)
	Intercept	Trend Intercept	& No Trend Intercept	&	Intercept	Trend & Intercept	No Trend & Intercept	
LNEXPORT	-2.5995*	==	==		==	==	==	I(0)
LNIMPORT	-4.7222***	==	==		==	==	==	I(0)
LNNON_OIL_EXP	-1.0125	-2.2736	0.8886		-9.3144***	==	==	1(1)
LNNON_OIL_IMP	-3.0697**	==	==		==	==	==	I(0)
LNOIL_EXP	-1.7723	-2.3255	0.7439		-9.9329***	==	==	I(1)
LNOIL_IMP	-3.7476***	==	==		==	==	==	I(0)
LNCAP_IMP	-9.7016***	==	==		==	==	==	I(0)
COMM_RATE	-2.1449	-2.2642	-0.2533		-15.2899***	==	==	I(1)
LNFDI	-10.056***	==	==		==	==	==	I(0)
LNIMP_COVER	-2.7382*	==	==		==	==	==	I(0)

MPR	-0.9248	-1.7677	0.5272	-11.3012***	==	==	I(1)
LN_PARALLEL	-0.9355	-1.7626	1.5769	-8.4406***	==	==	I(1)
LNRES	-2.8840**	-1.8421	-0.7274	==	==	==	I(0)

334 Note: LNEXPORT, LN IMPORT, LNNONOIL EXP, LNNONOIL IMP, LNOIL EXP, LNOIL_IMP, LNCAP_IMP,
335 COM_RATE, LNFDI, LN IMP_COVER, PARALLEL, MP, , R and RES stand for log of total export, log of total
336 imports, log of non-oil export, log of nonoil imports, log of oil export, log of oil import, log of capital import,
337 commercial bank interest rate, log of foreign direct investment, log of import coverage, parallel market exchange
338 rate, monetary policy rate, and log of foreign reserves respectively. *, **, *** represents 10%, 5%, 1% level of
339 significance respectively

340
341 Consequently, upon the results indicated in Table 3, it is important to examine whether the
342 model converges to its long-run state or not. The results of the Johansen co-integration test
343 for each model, that is, a model for total exports and imports, oil exports and imports, and
344 non-oil exports and import are presented in Table 4. A cursory look at Table 4 reveals that
345 long run convergence for total export, total import, and oil imports models are confirmed as
346 the critical values for the respective models are greater than the upper bound. However,
347 long-run convergence cannot be confirmed for non-oil exports, non-oil imports and oil
348 exports models since their respective critical values are less than the lower bound.
349 Consequently, both short-run dynamics and long run co-integrating equation are estimated
350 for total exports, total imports and oil imports while only short-run dynamics are estimated for
351 nonoil exports and imports alongside oil exports.

352
353
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Table 4: Johansen Co-integration Bounds test

MODELS	F-statistics			
Total Export	2.96			
Total import	4.51			
Oil export	1.62			
Oil import	4.81			
Nonoil export	1.64			
Nonoil import	1.54			
Critical value bounds				
Significance	10%	5%	2.5%	1%
I(0)-Lower bound	1.99	2.27	2.55	2.88
I(1)-Upper bound	2.94	3.28	3.61	3.99

355
356 Table 5 shows the short run dynamic and long-run co-integration results for total exports.
357 The short-run model indicates that current export values are positively affected by their first
358 and second lag values. Other variables that show positive effects include commercial banks'
359 interest rate, foreign reserves, and lag of monetary policy rate. However, current export is
360 negatively affected by current values of capital importation, foreign direct investment, and
361 monetary policy rate. It must however be noted that capital importation, current foreign direct

362 investment, foreign reserves, and current monetary policy rate have no significant effect on
 363 export. Exports are negatively and significantly affected by the lag value of foreign direct
 364 investment and the lag value of the monetary policy rate. Further, current interest rate of the
 365 commercial bank also has a negative and significant effect on exports. Specifically, a 1%
 366 increase in the current commercial banks interest rate reduces exports by 0.02% while the
 367 same percentage increase in previous monetary policy rate reduces exports by 0.03%.
 368 Hence, although the effect of interest rate on export is negative and mild, monetary policy
 369 interest rate tends to have a higher effect than commercial bank interest rate. Similar to the
 370 magnitude of the effect of interest rate, the effect of previous foreign direct investment on
 371 export is also mild, posting a 0.01% decrease for a 1% increase in previous foreign direct
 372 investment. In the long run, only commercial banks and monetary policy interest rates
 373 significantly affect exports. In particular, a 1% increase in commercial banks interest rate
 374 leads to a 0.3% decrease in exports while a 1% increase in monetary policy rate reduces
 375 exports by 0.2%. Hence, the commercial interest rate becomes more detrimental to exports
 376 in the long run than the monetary policy interest rate.
 377

378 **Table 5: Short-run dynamic and long run effect of parallel exchange rate on total**
 379 **export**

Short-run dynamic model

Variable	Coefficient	Prob.
D(LNEXPORT(-1))	0.3828***	0.0000
D(LNEXPORT(-2))	0.1107	0.1915
D(LNEXPORT(-3))	-0.5185***	0.0000
D(COMM_RATE)	-0.0155***	0.0053
D(LNCAP_IMP)	-0.0025	0.5462
D(LNFDI)	-0.0035	0.4430
D(LNFDI(-1))	-0.0109**	0.0169
D(LNPARALLEL)	-0.1878*	0.0660
D(LNRES)	0.2253	0.1212
D(MPR)	-0.0129	0.2664
D(MPR(-1))	-0.0254**	0.0264
CointEq(-1)	-0.0487***	0.0027

Long run Model

COMM_RATE	-0.3184*	0.0751
LNCAP_IMP	0.0528	0.5435

LNFDI	-0.1711	0.2925
LNPARALLEL	-1.9297**	0.0189
LNGRES	0.1890	0.7389
MPR	-0.2073*	0.0787
C	23.3450**	0.0191
<hr/>		
R ²	0.9793	
Adj R ²	0.9767	
DW	1.69	
F-Statistics	364.7727***	(0.000)

380 *Note: LNEXPORT, LN IMPORT, LNNONOIL EXP, LNNONOIL IMP, LNOIL EXP, LNOIL_IMP, LNCAP_IMP,*
381 *COM_RATE, LNFDI, LN IMP_COVER, PARALLEL, MPR and RES stand for a log of total export, log of total*
382 *imports, log of nonoil export, log of nonoil imports, log of oil export, log of oil import, log of capital import,*
383 *commercial bank interest rate, log of foreign direct investment, log of import coverage, parallel market exchange*
384 *rate, monetary .policy rate, and log of foreign reserves respective. *, **, *** represents 10%, 5%, 1% level of*
385 *significance respectively*

386
387 Now to the variable of interest, that is, the parallel exchange rate. The result indicates that
388 the parallel exchange rate significantly drags export proceeds both in the short run and the
389 long run (Table 5). In the short run, If the parallel exchange rate increases (depreciates) by
390 1%, exports fall by 0.2% while in the long run, a one percentage depreciation in the parallel
391 exchange rate precipitates exports to the tune of 1.9%. This outcome supports the notion
392 that the parallel market exchange rate tends to reduce official values of exports by under-
393 reporting the actual export that takes place. But perhaps exports would have fallen more if
394 there was no parallel market for exchange rate because converting naira to dollar in the
395 parallel market will be relatively cheaper than going through a bank. Thus, the main source
396 of reduction in exports will be through underreporting of exports. It is also noted that the
397 parallel market exchange rate has a notable inhibiting effect on exports in the long run. This
398 implies that foreign exchange rationing or regulation which gives way to a parallel market for
399 exchange rates will have a long-term dwarfing effect on Nigeria's exports.

400 The error correction coefficient indicates that the speed of adjustment from the short-run
401 dynamics to long-run equilibrium is 0.05%. In other words, if the system experiences a 10%
402 shock, a 0.4% adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium will take place in the current
403 month. Therefore, it will take more than 15 years for the adjustment to be fully accomplished.
404 The lesson from this outcome an economic policy that will affect exports may take a very
405 long time before it fully adjusts. Maybe this is the reason why the exports of Nigeria are still
406 not fully adjusted to policy changes. The value of R² 0.97 indicates that 97% variation in
407 export is explained by the explanatory variables considered. The adjusted R² is less than
408 R², which means it is the model is good. The F-Statistic which is less than 0.05 confirms that
409 the estimated model is significant and valid.

410 Table 6 shows the short-run dynamic and long-run co-integrating result of the effect of
411 parallel exchange rate on total imports. The result shows that short-run movement in imports
412 is positively and significantly affected by its lag. However, the third lag had negative and
413 significant effect. This indicates that it takes three months before previous imports will
414 reduce present imports. The short-run movement in total imports has the potential to be
415 positively affected by commercial bank interest rate, monetary policy rates, and foreign direct

416 investment. Besides the magnitude of impact would have been mild had the effect been
 417 significant. Also, external reserves have a positive and significant effect on the short-run
 418 movement of total imports in Nigeria. In this regard, a 1% increase in external reserve will
 419 engender a 0.5% increase in the short run movement of total imports. This result confirms
 420 the importance of reserve to importation through the supply of foreign exchange necessary
 421 to offset import bills. Meanwhile, import cover has a significant and negative effect on
 422 imports. In this regard, the short-run movement of total import will be adversely affected by
 423 0.3% for a 1% increase in capital import cover. This outcome could signal the fact that
 424 Nigeria's import structure is dominated not by capital goods but by final consumption goods.

425 The variable of interest is the parallel exchange rate. The result reveals that the short-run
 426 movement of imports is positively and significantly affected by the parallel exchange rate.
 427 For a 1% depreciation in the parallel exchange rate, the short-run movement of total imports
 428 will rise by 0.08%. This outcome also confirms the expected proposition. Parallel market
 429 exchange rate, caused by further stiffening of foreign exchange in the official market causes
 430 importers to explore the official rate for imports. Unfortunately, such foreign exchange
 431 accessed in the banks at the official rate appears not to be mostly for the purpose of capital
 432 importation as revealed in the result (Table 6) where a negative effect was discovered.
 433 Demand for foreign exchange in the official market will further exert pressure on foreign
 434 exchange, causing to depreciate further. Thus, this result suggests that the parallel
 435 exchange rate is a drag to the short-run balance of trade in Nigeria. However, a cursory
 436 inspection of the short-run magnitude of the effect of the parallel exchange rate on both
 437 exports and import suggests that the parallel exchange rate inhibits exports (-0.19) more
 438 than enhances imports (0.08). Thus, on the one hand, the J-curve that suggests a worsening
 439 trade balance in the short run is confirmed, that is, it appears depreciation of the parallel
 440 exchange rate also confirms the J-curve phenomenon. But crucially, it also indicates imports
 441 sluggishly respond to changes in parallel exchange rates. To see the picture, if the parallel
 442 exchange rate depreciates by 100%, imports will increase by 8% while exports will reduce by
 443 19%! Hence, the source of foreign exchange issues in Nigeria is importation, and the
 444 presence of a parallel exchange rate worsens the situation. When the presence of foreign
 445 exchange racketeers who purchase foreign exchange at a cheaper rate and sell it in the
 446 parallel market is added to the scene, exports will be further affected and there may be a
 447 vicious circle of foreign exchange crisis in the country.
 448
 449

450 **Table 6: Short-run dynamic and long-run effect of parallel exchange rate on total**
 451 **import**

Short run Dynamics

Variable	Coefficient	Prob.
D(LNIMPORT(-1))	0.2626**	0.0375
D(LNIMPORT(-2))	0.2442*	0.0649
D(LNIMPORT(-3))	-0.3801*	0.0690
D(COMM_RATE)	0.0142	0.4701
D(LNFDI)	0.0022	0.8918
D(LNIMP_COVER)	-0.2269**	0.0159

D(LNPARALLEL)	0.0788**	0.0379
D(LNRES)	0.5133***	0.0023
D(MPR)	0.0074	0.5242
CointEq(-1)	-0.7098***	0.0000

Long run Model

COMM_RATE	0.0201	0.4845
LNFDI	0.0032	0.8920
LNIMP_COVER	-0.8148***	0.0000
LNPARALLEL	0.1110**	0.0371
LNRES	0.7232***	0.0042
MPR	0.0105	0.5077
C	3.6259	0.2378
R ²	0.6311	
Adj R ²	0.5993	
DW	2.02	
Statistics	19.9032***	(0.0000)

452 *Note: LNEXPORT, LN IMPORT, LNNONOIL EXP, LNNONOIL IMP, LNOIL EXP, LNOIL_IMP, LNCAP_IMP,*
453 *COM_RATE, LNFDI, LN IMP_COVER, PARALLEL, MPR, and RES stand for a log of total export, log of total*
454 *imports, log of nonoil export, log of nonoil imports, log of oil export, log of oil import, log of capital import,*
455 *commercial bank interest rate, log of foreign direct investment, log of import coverage, parallel market exchange*
456 *rate, monetary .policy rate, and log of foreign reserves respective. *, **, *** represents 10%, 5%, 1% level of*
457 *significance respectively*

458 The error correction coefficient indicates the speed of adjustment from the short-run
459 dynamics to long-run equilibrium is 0.71 (Table 6). This implies that 0.71% of the long-run
460 disequilibrium in the previous months is adjusted in the first month for any 1 percentage
461 shock to the system. The remaining 0.29% will be captured in the following month. What
462 this implies is that total imports will adjust to a shock in less than 2 months unlike that of
463 exports that takes years. This again, is another reason why government policies that will
464 affect trade should be taken with care because the shock will have way long-range effect on
465 exports short effect on imports.

466 In the long run, the movement of total imports has the potential to be affected positively by
467 commercial banks' interest rate, foreign direct investment, and monetary policy rates. Import
468 cover has a negative and significant effect on the long run movement of imports.
469 Specifically, the long-run movement of imports will reduce by 0.8% for a 1% increase in
470 import cover. Thus, both in the short and long run, import cover precipitates imports. In the
471 case of a parallel exchange rate, the long run movement of total imports is positively affected
472 by this variable (Table 6). As can be read off, if the parallel exchange rate depreciates by

473 1%, the long-run movement of imports will increase by 0.11%. Thus, both in the short and
 474 long run, not only is parallel exchange rate significant to imports but also that it encourages
 475 importation. Similar to the case of the short run, the trade balance worsens in the long run.
 476 Since the magnitude of the parallel exchange rate effect on exports is negative and relatively
 477 notable (-1.93) while the magnitude of the effect on imports is positive and moderate, it turns
 478 out that the J-curve phenomenon breaks down. According to the J-curve phenomenon, trade
 479 balance may deteriorate in the short run following exchange rate depreciation but it will
 480 eventually improve in the long run. However, the result shows that both in the short run and
 481 long run, the trade balance worsens in the face of parallel exchange rate depreciation.

482 The adjusted R-squared indicates that 59.9% variation in import is explained by the
 483 explanatory variables considered. The F-Statistic which is less than 0.05 and Durbin Watson
 484 value of 2 confirm that the estimated model is significant and valid. Further diagnostic
 485 statistics are presented later in the study.

486 Table 7 presents the short-run and long-run co-integrating equation results for oil import. The
 487 short-run model shows that oil import is positively related to its first and second lags.
 488 Commercial banks interest rates, foreign direct investment, and monetary policy rates have
 489 the potential to negatively influence the short-run movement of oil imports. It is not
 490 surprising that these variables posted no significant effect because of the nature of the
 491 product and the government policy on oil. First, Nigeria is one of the outstanding producers
 492 of oil in the world so, there should not be any need for those variables to significantly
 493 influence the importation of the product. Second, the importation of oil is done solely by an
 494 agent of the government and consequently, those variables tend to be exogenous in the
 495 decision to import oil. Import cover has a negative and significant effect, indicating
 496 specifically that a 1% increase in the import cover will reduce the short-run movement of oil
 497 imports by 0.6%. The external reserve is significantly positively effective for oil importation.
 498 If external reserve increases by 1%, oil importation will rise by 1.4%. Hence, oil importation
 499 is highly sensitive to changes in external reserves. It must be recalled that the management
 500 of external reserves is part of the functions of the Central Bank of Nigeria, which invariably is
 501 a government agency. Thus, it is not surprising to observe a significant and positive effect
 502 (since the government is the arm that oversees the oil supply in Nigeria). What is curious is
 503 the magnitude of the effect that is, observing that the external reserve elasticity of oil import
 504 is elastic. This is a worrisome situation because it means that one source of reserve
 505 depletion in Nigeria is oil importation, which is not supposed to be given the position of
 506 Nigeria in the comity of world oil producers.

507 Parallel market expectedly has insignificant, albeit, positive effect on oil importation. This is
 508 not unexpected because the Nigerian National Petroleum Cooperation (NNPC) that is
 509 saddled with the responsibility of oil operations (both exports and imports) in Nigeria. Thus,
 510 the corporation need not patronize the parallel market for accessing foreign exchange.
 511 However, in the course of importing oil, more foreign exchange will be demanded in the
 512 official market, thereby mounting more pressure on the demand thereby making the parallel
 513 market for the exchange rate to strive. The positive sign indicates that there is a sign that
 514 more and larger demand for oil importation can be influenced by the parallel exchange rate.

515 **Table 7: Short run dynamic and long-run effect of the effect of parallel market**
 516 **exchange rate on total oil import**

517 ***Short run dynamics***

Variable	Coefficient	Prob.
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D(LNOIL_IMP(-1))	0.1646	0.1105
D(LNOIL_IMP(-2))	0.1142	0.2419
D(LNOIL_IMP(-3))	-0.3379**	0.0139
D(COMM_RATE)	-0.0217	0.4288
D(LNFDI)	-0.0013	0.9575
D(LNIMP_COVER)	-0.5761***	0.0000
D(LNPARALLEL)	0.0971	0.4652
D(LNRES)	1.3933*	0.0786
D(LNRES(-1))	1.4043*	0.0712
D(MPR)	-0.0151	0.3874
CointEq(-1)	-0.4656***	0.0000

Long run Model		
COMM_RATE	-0.0466	0.4179
LNFDI	-0.0028	0.9575
LNIMP_COVER	-1.2374***	0.0002
LNPARALLEL	0.2086	0.5037
LNRES	1.3689***	0.0080
MPR	-0.0324	0.4313
C	-3.5706	0.5676
R ²	0.6714	
Adj R ²	0.6404	
DW	2.04	
F-statistics	21.6262	(0.0000)

518 *Note: LNEXPORT, LN IMPORT, LNNONOIL EXP, LNNONOIL IMP, LNOIL EXP, LNOIL_IMP, LNCAP_IMP,*
519 *COM_RATE, LNFDI, LN IMP_COVER, PARALLEL, MPR, and RES stand for a log of total export, log of total*
520 *imports, log of nonoil export, log of nonoil imports, log of oil export, log of oil import, log of capital import,*
521 *commercial bank interest rate, log of foreign direct investment, log of import coverage, parallel market exchange*
522 *rate, monetary .policy rate, and log of foreign reserves respective. *, **, *** represents 10%, 5%, 1% level of*
523 *significance respectively*

524 The error correction coefficient indicates the speed of adjustment from the short-run
525 dynamics to long-run equilibrium is 0.47 (Table 7). In this case, 46.56% of the long-run
526 disequilibrium in the previous months is adjusted in the first month following a 100%
527 distortion to the system while the rest 53.44% is accounted for by the following months.
528 Specifically, the system will adjust to the long-run equilibrium in less than 3 months following
529 a disturbance to the system (including the month when the disturbance takes place)

530 In the long run commercial banks' interest rates, foreign direct investment, and monetary
 531 policy rates have negative and insignificant effects on oil imports. This implies that both in
 532 the short and long run, these show signs of negatively affecting oil imports (Table 7). Like
 533 the case of the short-run dynamic, import cover has a negative and significant effect on oil
 534 imports while external reserves have a positive and significant effect. However, the
 535 magnitude of the effect of external reserve is relatively more pronounced in the short run
 536 (1.40) than in the long run (1.37). Similarly, the parallel market has no significant influence
 537 on the long-run movement of oil imports. Hence, either in the short run or long run, the
 538 parallel market exchange rate does not significant, albeit, positive role in the movement of oil
 539 imports. The statistical value of the adjusted R-squared is 0.64, indicating that 64% variation
 540 in export is explained by the explanatory variables (Table 7), meaning that the model is
 541 good. The probability value for the F-Statistic is less than 0.05 and Durbin Watson value is
 542 around 2 and all these statistical indicators confirm that the estimated model is valid.

543 On the ground that models of oil export, non-oil exports, and imports do not co-integrate to
 544 the long-run equilibrium, short-run dynamics are estimated and reported. Starting with the
 545 results of the non-oil exports, short-run movement in non-oil export is positively and
 546 significantly related to the previous value of non-oil export. In this regard, the short-run
 547 movement in non-oil export is driven to the tune of 0.2% for a 1% movement in the previous
 548 value of the variable. However, the third lag shows a negative and significant effect. What
 549 this implies is that there is positive inertia built into the non-oil export. This inertia can be
 550 informed by the preference for Nigerian products either by foreigners or by Nigerian
 551 emigrants. Studies have confirmed that Nigerian emigrants demand their locally produced
 552 goods and, in some countries such as Iceland, Ireland, Sweden, and the US, there are big
 553 stalls where Nigerian products are sold (IOM, 2014). Commercial bank's interest rates,
 554 monetary policy interest rates, and foreign direct investment have negative but insignificant
 555 impacts on the short run movement of non-oil export. It is worrisome that foreign direct
 556 investment not only insignificantly affects non-oil exports but also that the direction of effect
 557 is negative. Meanwhile, the main reason this could be so is that most foreign direct
 558 investment is either in the oil sector or in firms that serve the domestic economy. The
 559 potential negative effect indicated by the commercial bank's interest rate suggests that the
 560 cost of funding exports through banks still discourages intending exporters.

561 Parallel exchange rate exerts a negative and significant effect on the short-run movement of
 562 non-oil export. In this regard, if the parallel exchange rate depreciates by 1%, nonoil exports
 563 will fall by 0.13% in the short run. This confirms how detrimental the parallel exchange rate is
 564 to non-oil exports. Owing to the existence of a parallel exchange rate, some non-oil export
 565 products will be carried out through a clandestine channel to avoid low returns (of local
 566 currency) from their exports. However, inspecting the magnitude of the effect, the reduction
 567 in non-oil export following parallel exchange rate is mild. Barring asymmetry in the
 568 exchange rate movement, an appreciation of parallel exchange rate will encourage exports
 569 by 0.13%. Thus, short-run movement in non-oil export tends not to be highly sensitive to
 570 changes in parallel market exchanger rate.

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Table 8: Short-run dynamic of the effect of parallel market exchange rate on total non-oil export

Variable	Coefficient	Prob.
D(LNNON_OIL_EXP(-1))	0.1943**	0.0354
D(LNNON_OIL_EXP(-2))	0.0969	0.3101

D(LNNON_OIL_EXP(-3))	-0.4824***	0.0003
D(COMM_RATE)	-0.0312	0.1500
D(LNCAP_IMP)	0.0352**	0.0476
D(LNFDI)	-0.0134	0.4912
D(LNPARALLEL)	-0.1274***	0.001231
D(LNRES)	0.1217	0.2791
D(MPR)	-0.0014	0.9150
CointEq(-1)	-0.1449	0.1338
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R ²	0.8249	
Adj R ²	0.8114	
DW	1.97	
F-statistics	60.8061	(0.0000)

575 *Note: LNEXPORT, LN IMPORT, LNNONOIL EXP, LNNONOIL IMP, LNOIL EXP, LNOIL_IMP, LNCAP_IMP,*
576 *COM_RATE, LNFDI, LN IMP_COVER, PARALLEL, MPR, and RES stand for a log of total export, log of total*
577 *imports, log of nonoil export, log of nonoil imports, log of oil export, log of oil import, log of capital import,*
578 *commercial bank interest rate, log of foreign direct investment, log of import coverage, parallel market exchange*
579 *rate, monetary .policy rate, and log of foreign reserves respective. *, **, *** represents 10%, 5%, 1% level of*
580 *significance respectively*

581

582 The error correction coefficient in the table is insignificant, albeit, exhibiting the right sign.
583 This confirms the nonexistence of long-run co-integration of the variables. The adjusted R-
584 squared is 0.81, which indicates that more than 80% of the variation in non-oil export is
585 explained by the considered explanatory variables. Similarly, the probability value associated
586 with the F-statistics is less than 0.05 while the Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.97. These
587 statistical indicators suggest that the estimated model is significant and efficient and hence
588 valid for policy prescription.

589 The short-run movement of non-oil imports is positively related to the lag of non-oil imports
590 by the first and second periods, commercial banks rate, external reserves, foreign direct
591 investment, monetary policy rate (including the third lags), and parallel exchange rate (Table
592 9). The short run movement in non-oil import is negatively related to the third lag of non-oil
593 import, the import cover, and the first lag of monetary policy rate. While the first and third
594 lags of non-oil imports significantly affect the movement of non-oil import, the second lag
595 was not significant. But what should be noted is that it appears non-oil import is highly
596 pronounced in Nigeria. Another point to note is that with time, Nigeria tends to be producing
597 import substituting products so that less and less imports of non-oil products are purchased.
598 Foreign direct investment, first and second lags of monetary policy rates, show potential
599 influence on the short run movement of non-oil imports but they are insignificant. Both
600 commercial banks interest rate and external reserves have significant impact. In particular,
601 an increase in commercial banks interest rate to the tune of 1% will engender a 0.01%
602 increase in non-oil imports. Of course, this result appears to be counterintuitive but it might
603 indicate that the interest rates charged by the commercial banks have not reached a point
604 where it will be discouraging for importers of non-oil products. A similar situation is observed
605 in the case of the third lag of the monetary policy rate. But what should be noted crucially is

606 the magnitude of the effect (Table 9). For both commercial banks and monetary policy
 607 interest rates, the magnitudes are meager, almost negligible. The significant effect of reserve
 608 on the short-run movement of non-oil import is not surprising. Besides, the magnitude of the
 609 effect is modest, because, for a 1% increase in external reserve, non-oil imports will rise by
 610 0.13 percentage points. Import cover has a significant effect, posting a 0.12% negative
 611 effect on the short-run movement of non-oil imports for a 1 percentage increase (Table 9).

612 The parallel exchange rate is pronounced in the short-run movement of non-oil imports
 613 (Table 9). Both the current and immediate previous values of parallel exchange rate matter
 614 for the importation of non-oil products. Previous depreciation of the parallel exchange rate
 615 by 1% enhances non-oil imports by 0.4% while current depreciation engenders
 616 approximately 0.1%. Referring to non-oil export's response to the parallel market exchange
 617 rate, depreciation influences imports more than exports. However, looking at the period of
 618 effect, the current change rate in the parallel market affects non-oil exports (0.13) (Table 8)
 619 than non-oil imports (0.1) (Table 9). It is the case that non-oil imports tend not to respond
 620 significantly to current changes in parallel exchange rates. However, the previous change in
 621 the parallel exchange rate is what matters most for non-oil imports. Thus, the parallel
 622 exchange rate affects non-oil export and non-oil import differently in terms of magnitude,
 623 direction, and period. However, it is possible to inspect whether the condition for J-curve
 624 exists in the short run for non-oil trade. Depreciation of the parallel exchange rate reduces
 625 exports and increases imports, hence non-oil trade balance is in deficit. Therefore, the
 626 condition for J-curve exists in the short run. However, since no long-run estimation owing to
 627 the non-cointegration of the model, the validity of the J-curve as informed by the depreciation
 628 of the parallel exchange rate is inconclusive. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the
 629 parallel market exchange rate is detrimental to the short-run non-oil trade and the
 630 detrimental effect comes mostly from importation (0.4) (Table 9).

631 Similar to the case of non-oil exports, the error correction coefficient for non-oil imports is
 632 also not significant, albeit, exhibiting the right sign. This confirms the nonexistence of long-
 633 run co-integration of the variables. The adjusted R-squared is approximately 0.72, which
 634 indicates that more than 70% variation in non-oil imports is explained by the considered
 635 explanatory variables. Similarly, the probability value associated with the F-statistics is less
 636 than 0.05 while the Durbin-Watson statistic is around 2. These statistical indicators suggest
 637 that the estimated model is significant and efficient and hence valid for policy prescription.
 638
 639

640 **Table 9: Short run dynamic showing the effect of effect of parallel exchange rate on**
 641 **non-oil import**

Variable	Coefficient	Prob.
D(LNNON_OIL_IMP(-1))	0.2848***	0.0000
D(LNNON_OIL_IMP(-2))	0.0136	0.8597
D(LNNON_OIL_IMP(-3))	-0.5907***	0.0000
D(COMM_RATE)	0.0124*	0.0990
D(LNFDI)	0.0004	0.9483
D(LNIMP_COVER)	-0.1187**	0.0062

D(LNPARALLEL)	0.0977	0.6030
D(LNPARALLEL(-1))	0.3912**	0.0305
D(GRES)	0.1383*	0.0665
D(MPR)	0.0206	0.1921
(MPR(-1))	-0.0095	0.6459
D(MPR(-2))	0.0289*	0.0601
CointEq(-1)	-0.0434	0.4550
C	-29.3531	0.5500
<hr/>		
R ²	0.7278	
Adj R ²	0.7184	
DW	1.57	
Statistics	98.8016	(0.0000)

642 *Note: LNEXPORT, LN IMPORT, LNNONOIL EXP, LNNONOIL IMP, LNOIL EXP, LNOIL_IMP, LNCAP_IMP,*
643 *COM_RATE, LNFDI, LN IMP_COVER, PARALLEL, MPR, and RES stand for a log of total export, log of total*
644 *imports, log of nonoil export, log of nonoil imports, log of oil export, log of oil import, log of capital import,*
645 *commercial bank interest rate, log of foreign direct investment, log of import coverage, parallel market exchange*
646 *rate, monetary policy rate, and log of foreign reserves respective. *, **, *** represents 10%, 5%, 1% level of*
647 *significance respectively*

648
649 The result of the oil exports effects of parallel exchange rate alongside other catchall
650 variables is presented in Table 10. The result reveals that the short-run movement in oil
651 export is negatively and significantly related to its first and second lags. The first lag
652 suggests that the short-run movement in oil export is reduced by 0.3% for a 1% increase in
653 the previous oil exports. In the same vein, the movement in the oil export is reduced by
654 0.33% for a 1% increase in the second lag of oil export. Similar to the results obtained
655 earlier, commercial banks' interest rate, monetary policy interest rate, and capital import
656 (import cover) insignificantly influence the short-run movement in oil exports. Unlike results
657 obtained earlier, foreign direct investment has a significant and positive influence on the
658 short-run movement in oil export. In this regard, a 1% increase in foreign direct investment
659 raises short-run oil imports by 0.002%. The magnitude of the effect is mild, suggesting that
660 changes in foreign direct investment in the oil sector will have a slight effect on the
661 exportation of Nigerian oil.

662 Parallel exchange rate negatively and significantly affects oil exports. If the parallel
663 exchange rate depreciates by 1%, oil exports will fall by 0.95%. This result first indicates that
664 oil exportation is sensitive to changes in parallel exchange rates. Second, it is the case that
665 a huge underground oil exportation takes place in Nigeria thereby hampering officially
666 recorded oil exports. There have been cases of illegal oil exploration in the oil-rich region of
667 Nigeria and most of these illegal oil exploration finds its way out of the country illegally.
668 What role does parallel exchange play in this arrangement and how does that lead to a
669 negative effect on oil export? Those engaging in illegal activity will access a parallel market
670 to aid production, making access to foreign exchange in the official market more difficult and
671 stringent. The returns from the sales of illegal oil exports may not be officially reported and

672 so, not officially available in the market. Owing to the illegality and the fear of being caught in
 673 the process, some exporters of illegal oil may decide to accept domestic currency. In any of
 674 these cases, foreign exchange becomes officially scarce, thereby leading to a reduction in
 675 official oil exports.

676

677

678 **Table 10: Short-run dynamic results of the effect of parallel exchange rate on total oil**
 679 **export**

Variable	Coefficient	Prob.
D(LNOIL_EXP(-1))	-0.273574**	0.0267
D(LNOIL_EXP(-2))	-0.325125**	0.0179
D(COMM_RATE)	0.026132	0.1895
D(LNCAP_IMP)	-0.019527	0.2156
D(LNFDI)	0.002930*	0.08616
D(LNPARALLEL)	-0.948637*	0.0517
D(LNRES)	1.050333**	0.0482
D(MPR)	-0.007193	0.5117
CointEq(-1)	-0.1128	0.2209
C	9.9094	0.3482
R2	0.7934	
Adj R2	0.7758	
DW	2.05	
Statistics	45.0325	(0.0000)

680 *Note: LNEXPORT, LN IMPORT, LNNONOIL EXP, LNNONOIL IMP, LNOIL EXP, LNOIL_IMP, LNCAP_IMP,*
 681 *COM_RATE, LNFDI, LN IMP_COVER, PARALLEL, MPR, and RES stand for a log of total export, log of total*
 682 *imports, log of nonoil export, log of nonoil imports, log of oil export, log of oil import, log of capital import,*
 683 *commercial bank interest rate, log of foreign direct investment, log of import coverage, parallel market exchange*
 684 *rate, monetary policy rate, and log of foreign reserves respective. *, **, *** represents 10%, 5%, 1% level of*
 685 *significance respectively*

686 The error correction coefficient for oil exports is also insignificant, albeit, exhibiting the right
 687 sign. This confirms the nonexistence of long-run co-integration of the variables. The
 688 adjusted R-squared is approximately 0.78, which indicates close to 80% variation in non-oil
 689 imports is explained by the considered explanatory variables. Similarly, the probability value
 690 associated with the F-statistics is less than 0.05 while the Durbin-Watson statistic is around
 691 2. These statistical indicators suggest that the estimated model is significant and efficient
 692 and hence valid for policy prescription.

693 3.1 Diagnostic test

694 The Breusch-Godfrey test -for the test of auto-correlation, the ARCH (for the test of
 695 heteroscedasticity), Ramsey-RESET test (for the test of linearity) for all the variables above
 696 are indicated in Table 11. The result indicates that the hypothesis of no autocorrelation is
 697 rejected for all the models.

698

699

700

701 **Table 11: Diagnostic tests of the models**

	Breuch-Godfrey (Probability)	ARCH (Probability)	Ramsey-RESET (Probability)
Export model	0.3327(1.004)	0.777(0.7808)	1.3200(0.2046)
Import model	0.2098(0.8110)	0.0104(0.9850)	2.1158(0.1483)
Non-oil export	0.4259(0.6541)	0.1323(0.7166)	2.6388(0.0411)
Non-oil import	0.8664(0.1315)	8.4406(0.0045)	0.0714(0.7898)
Oil export	1.8775(0.1320)	1.3752(0.2399)	2.7366(0.1400)
Oil import	0.1404(0.8548)	5.1578(0.0247)	1.3912(0.4679)

702 *Note: Probabilities values are in Parentheses*

703

704 This suggests that there is a presence of serial correlation in any of the ARDL models. The
 705 ARCH test which indicates the presence of heteroscedasticity, has probability values greater
 706 than 5% for all the models. This explains that there is no presence of heteroscedasticity in
 707 these models. Ramsey- RESET test results also have a probability value greater than 5%,
 708 which means no issue of functional misspecification in any of the models. Consequently from
 709 the diagnostic results, the results arising from the estimation are reliable, valid, and in order
 710 for understanding the role parallel market for exchange rate plays in international trade in
 711 Nigeria. The result can therefore be useful for policy prescription.

712

713

714 **4. CONCLUSION**

715 The study analyses the influence of the parallel exchange rate on the international trade in
 716 Nigeria. The motivation for this study is borne out of the fact that almost all readily available
 717 and accessible studies on the exchange rate and trade in Nigeria employs the official
 718 exchange rate whereas there exists multiple windows for foreign exchange thereby
 719 prompting the existence of a functional parallel market for exchange rate. Therefore, it is
 720 imperative to establish whether the parallel market for exchange rates inhibits or enhances
 721 international trade. Besides, in the face of multiple exchange rates, when there is a change
 722 in the official exchange rate, even though the parallel exchange rate will react in the same
 723 manner, in some cases, parallel markets can also trigger or cause policymakers to reset the
 724 official exchange rate. Thus, the effect of parallel exchange rates on trade requires close
 725 attention.

726 To be more comprehensive, after analyzing the effect on total export and total import
727 separately, the authors further unravel the influence of parallel exchange rate on the major
728 components of exports and imports, that is, oil and non-oil exports and imports respectively.
729 If total trade responds to the exchange rate, it is not clear whether the same result will be
730 obtained when trade is disaggregated. Thus, lumping up all products into one could result in
731 aggregation bias, a very serious issue in quantitative research. Disaggregating trade into oil
732 and non-oil trade in the case of Nigeria will further shed light on the particular sector (oil or
733 non-oil) that is affected by the parallel exchange rate. Monthly data from January 2007 to
734 December 2022 (2007:1-2022:12) were extracted from the online data repository of the
735 Central Bank of Nigeria. Employing the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) estimation
736 method, it was observed that total exports, total imports, and oil imports exhibit co-
737 integration to the long-run equilibrium while the same cannot be confirmed for other models.
738 Consequently, only short-run dynamics were analyzed for the movement in nonoil exports
739 and imports and oil exports. The result indicates that the short-run dynamic of total exports is
740 negatively and significantly affected by the parallel exchange rate while the short-run
741 dynamic of imports is positively and significantly influenced by the parallel exchange rate. In
742 the same vein, the parallel exchange rate affects short-run movement in non-oil exports
743 negatively and significantly. The effect of the parallel exchange rate on the short-run
744 dynamics of non-oil imports is persistent since both the current and previous changes in the
745 parallel market have positive and significant effect on non-oil imports. It is also of note that
746 short-run movement in oil export is negatively and significantly affected by the parallel
747 exchange rate. In the long run, a parallel exchange rate inhibits total export but total import
748 and oil imports exert a positive effect. However, the effect of a parallel exchange rate on the
749 long-run movement of oil imports is insignificant. Therefore, it can be concluded that the
750 depreciation of the parallel exchange rate is detrimental to exports particularly non-oil
751 exports. Further, the depreciation of the parallel exchange rate encourages imports and is
752 highly persistent in influencing non-oil imports.

753 The J-curve phenomenon breaks down for the total balance of trade because although in the
754 short run, the trade balance worsens following the parallel exchange rate, it worsens further
755 in the long run, contrary to the prediction of the J-curve that the trade balance will improve.
756 However, the J-curve phenomenon cannot be confirmed in the case of the oil trade balance
757 because in the short run, the oil trade balance worsens following parallel exchange rate
758 depreciation but in the long run oil import shows a positive and insignificant effect while there
759 is no information about the long run effect of parallel exchange rate on oil export.
760 Meanwhile, since oil import shows a positive effect, the J-curve phenomenon may break
761 down. In the case of non-oil trade balance, the short-run outcome conforms to the existence
762 of J-curve prediction because the non-oil trade balance deteriorates following parallel
763 exchange rate depreciation.

764 Following the conclusion, the policy implication as long as a parallel market for exchange
765 rates exists, the official trade balance will deteriorate and there can be vicious us circle of
766 trade deterioration. Of importance is the detrimental effect that the parallel market has on the
767 non-oil trade. Now that the country is trying to focus more on the non-oil sector and possibly
768 be able to earn more foreign exchange through the production and export of non-oil
769 products, policymakers need to find a solution to the multiple windows for foreign exchange.
770 The policy of a floating exchange rate may not work out if flairs for imports are not
771 addressed. Our result indicates that non-oil import is persistent in their response to the
772 depreciation of the parallel exchange rate. Thus, non-oil importation, particularly products
773 that will require the payment of huge amounts of foreign exchange should be discouraged.
774 Some of the non-oil imported products that consume foreign exchange are expensive
775 (bulletproof) sport utility vehicles by government officials, and highly expensive imported
776 furniture and fittings to mention a few. This set of non-oil imported products drains foreign

777 exchange and it makes foreign exchange less available for productive use in the non-oil
778 sector.

779 Accumulation of reserve is very important to be able to accommodate non-oil import outlay.
780 Hence, prudence in the spending of reserves is very important. In this case, the reserve can
781 be preserved during the boom period. Also, foreign reserves can be spent on non-oil
782 imports such as capital goods that will help grow the economy. Import cover inhibits non-oil
783 import, oil import, and non-oil export. Hence, the authorities should look into the nature of
784 import cover to unravel why it negatively affects trade.

785

786 **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

787

788 The authors of this research work appreciate the editorial team of the Asian Journal of
789 Economics, Business and Accounting for their professionalism in the handling of this work
790 right from the first acknowledgement of submission to the final acceptance. Our appreciation
791 also goes to our colleagues in the Department of Economics, Department of Banking and
792 Finance, Federal University of Agriculture, Abeokuta, who supported in terms of data and
793 advice on methodology.

794

795

796 **COMPETING INTERESTS**

797

798 The authors certify that they have no affiliations with or involvement in any organization or
799 entity with any financial interest or non-financial interest in the subject matter or materials
800 discussed in this manuscript.

801

802 **AUTHORS' CONTRIBUTIONS**

803

804 O.J Oyetayo conceived the presented idea and developed the theory. Together with E.A
805 Olubiyi and F.G Olaifa, data collection was done. O.J Oyetayo suggested the econometric
806 methods which was verified by E.A Olubiyi. Data collection was done by O.J Oyetayo and
807 F.G Olaifa prepared data ready for analysis. E.A Olubiyi analyzed and O.J Oyetayo
808 interpreted the analysis. F.G Olaifa compiled the body of the work with citations. E.A Olubiyi
809 vetted the work. Referencing was done by O.J Oyetayo and F.G Olaifa.

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APPENDIX