

1 *Original Research Article*

2 **Case investigation, contact tracing and containment prevents spread of COVID-19 in**

3 **Shibchar, Madaripur, Bangladesh 2020: An evidence based observational study**

4

UNDER PEER REVIEW

5 **Abstract**

6 Background: In December 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic began in Wuhan and quickly spread
7 in China and other countries in the world. The SARS-CoV-2 virus reached Bangladesh in March
8 2020 and the index case of the first cluster of COVID-19 was reported on 13 March, 2020, in
9 Madaripur District.

10 Methods: A team from the Institute of Epidemiology Disease Control and Research (IEDCR), of
11 Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Bangladesh investigated the cluster, established active
12 syndromic surveillance for respiratory diseases, and implemented control activities.

13 Results: The index case traveled from Italy to Bangladesh and developed respiratory symptoms
14 and sought medical treatment in Dhaka. He was diagnosed with COVID-19 and transferred and
15 isolated in a hospital on the day of diagnosis. We followed up his contacts as soon as we got their
16 names and contact information. We quarantined 34 among 139 contacts, rest of them were
17 missed contacts. The attack rate among the index cases' contacts was 18% (6/34). Eight cases in
18 Madaripur District with COVID-19 were epidemiologically linked to the index case. The most
19 common symptoms were fever (100%) and cough (86%). One case was asymptomatic. The
20 Bangladesh influenza pandemic containment plan was modified for COVID-19 mitigation which
21 included establishing a containment zone, mobilizing the local administrative authorities, and
22 obtaining support from local community, religious and political leaders. Active case search in the
23 containment zone identified new cases. No new cases were linked with the nine COVID-19
24 cases.

25 Conclusion: Active surveillance by health authority, prompt isolation of cases, quarantine of
26 contacts and establishing a containment zone to focus mitigation efforts supported the prevention
27 efforts for further transmission of the virus from this first COVID-19 cluster in Bangladesh.

28 **Keywords:** Isolation, quarantine, containment, COVID-19, Bangladesh

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32 **INTRODUCTION**

33 The COVID-19 was first reported in Wuhan, China on 27 December 2019. In the
34 following weeks, COVID-19 quickly spread to other regions in China and the world. The first
35 case of COVID-19 outside of China was reported in Thailand on 13 January 2020 and COVID-
36 19 reached Bangladesh when two Bangladesh residents returned from Italy on 8 March 2020
37 (1)(2). On 11 March 2020 the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a global pandemic
38 due to COVID-19 (3).

39 The SARS-CoV-2 virus is transmitted from human to human through droplet or fomites
40 and has a basic reproduction number (R_0) between 2-3 (3,4). When R_0 is below one, an outbreak
41 cannot be sustained and will end. R_0 can be reduced by rapidly isolating people with COVID-19
42 and quarantining their contacts. Contact tracing begins with interviewing someone diagnosed
43 with COVID-19 to identify everyone they contacted during their infectious phase. The contacts
44 must be quarantined and tested for COVID-19 as soon as possible. A good measure to
45 demonstrate if mitigation activities, surveillance, and contact tracing is successful is when all
46 new COVID-19 cases are on the list of contacts.

47 Containment strategies help prevent the spread of infectious diseases. The plan to contain
48 pandemic influenza contains a localized geographical containment strategy that includes
49 identifying active cases, restricting their movement, and isolating and quarantining their contacts
50 (5). Singapore, India, and Vietnam implemented containment strategies when community spread

51 of COVID-19 was first detected and successfully stopped transmission of COVID-19 in small
52 communities (6-9).

53 The Government of Bangladesh has a policy to investigate people diagnosed with
54 COVID-19 and trace their contacts. A cluster of COVID-19 cases in Shibchar Upazilla,
55 Madaripur district was reported to the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) on 13
56 March 2020. This paper describes the transmission of COVID-19 in this cluster and the
57 interventions that to prevent the transmission of COVID-19 in the Upazilla.

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59 **METHODS**

60 This study involves two parts. The first part consists of a case report of COVID-19 and
61 the tracing and resolution of their contacts from 13 March to 15 April 2020. The second part
62 describes the containment interventions from 20 March to 3 April 2020.

63

64 **Case investigation and contact tracing**

65 We used the WHO case definitions for COVID-19 cases and contacts (11,12):

66 **Suspected case:** A patient with an acute respiratory illness (fever and at least one
67 sign/symptom of respiratory disease, e.g., cough, shortness of breath), and a history of
68 travel to or residence in a location reporting community transmission of COVID-19
69 disease during the 14 days prior to symptom onset; or a patient with any acute respiratory
70 illness and having been in contact with a confirmed or probable COVID-19 case in the
71 last 14 days prior to symptom onset; **or** a patient with severe acute respiratory illness
72 (fever and at least one sign/symptom of respiratory disease (e.g., cough, shortness of

73 breath)) and requiring hospitalization) and in the absence of an alternative diagnosis that
74 fully explains the clinical presentation.

75 **Confirmed case:** a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection,
76 irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms.

77 **Contact:** a person who had any one of the following exposures during the 4 days before
78 and the 14 days after the onset of symptoms of a probable or confirmed case:

79 Face-to-face contact with a probable or confirmed case within 1 meter and for more than
80 15 minutes;

81 Direct physical contact with a probable or confirmed case; or

82 Direct care for a patient with probable or confirmed COVID-19 disease without using
83 proper personal protective equipment.

84 Our definition of **missed contact** was a contact of a confirmed COVID-19 case that had
85 exposure to a case but could not be identified or followed up for any reason including any
86 contacts at public places or public transports from where there was no record and they could not
87 be traced out.

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89 **The containment zone**

90 Shibchar is subdistrict of Madaripur District 130 km southeast of Dhaka. The
91 containment zone included two wards of Shibchar union and two wards of pachchar and
92 bahertola union of Shibchar upazila with a population of fifteen thousand (10–12). . Containment
93 started on 19 March and ended on 3 April with first cluster of eight cases at Shibchar upazila.
94 The main economy of Shibchar is farming and fishing. The sub-district is surrounded by a

95 natural boundary consisting of the Arial Kha River on the west and south and a national
96 highway on the east and north to separate from other surrounding administrative areas.

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98 **Data collection**

99 A team from the Institute of Epidemiology Disease Control and Research (IEDCR)
100 under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW), Bangladesh Conducted the
101 investigation. The team comprised of trained field epidemiologists and laboratory technologists
102 and interviewed the index case and traced his contacts according to the MoHFW manual for
103 COVID-19 case investigation (13,14). Interviews were conducted by cell phone and responses
104 recorded on the COVID-19 Case Record Form (15). We collected detailed chronological history
105 of every confirmed case starting from four days prior to their onset of symptoms to two weeks
106 after onset of symptoms to identify potential contacts. Isolation of cases and home quarantine of
107 all identified contacts were ensured following a Standard Operating Procedure (16) which
108 included calling contacts daily for 14 days after last exposure to a confirmed case to ascertain
109 whether they developed COVID-19 symptoms and whether they obeyed isolation or quarantine.
110 Local police with the support from local community and religious leaders monitored household
111 isolation, quarantine, and community containment. Local administrative and health departments
112 also assisted with containment process.

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114 **Surveillance**

115 Government community health workers conducted house-to-house active case search
116 with the lead and direct supervision of IEDCR team maintaining the infection prevention control
117 measures(16) including use of personal protective equipment in the containment area for people

118 with COVID-19 like symptoms from 13 March to 15 April, 2020.. After this date, passive
119 surveillance for COVID-19 by IEDCR and active case search by the local health authority
120 continued for the duration of the pandemic.

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123 **RESULTS**

124 **Description of index case and subsequent cases of COVID-19,**

125 Case 01 was a male aged 38 years, diabetic. s who departed Milan, Italy at 10 pm on 6
126 March 2020 and arrived in Dhaka, Bangladesh on 7 March at 5 pm. During his travel he was
127 accompanied with two more persons. We identified both of them as his close contacts. Among
128 them one became positive after few days. Another person was quarantined for 14 days and tested
129 negative for COVID-19 with RT-PCR. Case 01 developed mild cough and malaise on 5 March
130 2020 followed by fever and weakness on 9 March. Upon arrival in Bangladesh, case 01 returned
131 to his home in Shibchor. He saw a physician on 11 March and was treated for generalized body
132 ache and given medication. On 13 March his symptoms got worse and he traveled to a
133 government hospital in Dhaka. His physician suspected COVID-19 and notified IEDCR on 13
134 March 2020. A nasal swab collected on 13 March and 14 March he was diagnosed as SARS-
135 CoV-2 positive by RT-PCR test. All the attending physicians and staff who met our case
136 definition were included in the contact list and tested for COVID-19. His travel history was
137 shared with WHO following reporting requirements by the International Health Regulations
138 (IHR).

139 Case 01 reported 34 contacts and 129 missed contacts (Table 1). As Case 01 used public
140 transport for traveling between Dhaka and his home town and travelers using public transport do

141 not need to provide any identifiable information, we could not trace out those missing contacts.
142 Of his two travel companions from Italy, case 07, was COVID-19 positive, and lived in the same
143 town.. Case 07 developed symptoms on 14th March. We collected sample from case 07 on 15th
144 March and we received RT-PCR positive result for COVID-19 on 18 March 2020. Case 07 was
145 exposed to case 01 for sixteen hours during their trip to Bangladesh and developed symptoms on
146 14 March 2020. He had no other probable exposures to SARS-CoV-2 in Italy and he was home
147 quarantined in Bangladesh. Therefore, we concluded that case 07 contracted COVID-19 from
148 case 01. All seven identified contacts of case 07 were quarantined for 14 days at home and no
149 one of them developed any COVID-19 symptoms.

150 From the identified contacts of Case 01 we diagnosed six more positive cases with COVID-19
151 from 7-13 April 2020. Case 01 spread COVID-19 to six other people from 7th to 13th March 2020
152 with a secondary attack rate of 18% (6/34) (Figure 1). Among the six cases, two were child and
153 four were adults. His wife and two children affected first. Subsequent cases were identified from
154 his relatives.

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


Figure 1. COVID-19 cluster of cases at Shibchar, Madaripur, Bangladesh, March 2020

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All cases had direct contact with the index case except case 08. After returning to his hometown, from 7 March 2020, case 01 stayed with his wife and two children. His wife (case 02), aged 25 years, developed COVID-19 like symptoms on 12 March 2020 and their two children (case 03 and 04) aged 2 and 6 years respectively developed symptoms on 13 March 2020.

Case 01 visited his parent's house on 10 March 2020 and stayed there for couple of hours. We included his parents in the contact list of case 01 and quarantined them at home accordingly. His father, age 65 years developed symptoms (case 06) on 17 March 2020. Case

166 06 was hypertensive and had the history of bronchial asthma. Samples were collected on 18
167 March 2020 and sent to IEDCR, Dhaka for RT-PCR.

168 The most common symptoms of the total eight COVID-19 cases were fever and cough
169 (Table 1). There was one asymptomatic case in this cluster.

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| Symptoms | Frequency (%) (N=8) |
|-------------|---------------------|
| Fever | 100 |
| Cough | 75 |
| Headache | 50 |
| Body ache | 50 |
| Sore throat | 37 |

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Table 1. Frequencies of symptoms of the first cluster of COVID-19 cases in Bangladesh, March 2020

177 Both of case 01's in laws visited his house on 9 March 2020. Father-in-law returned back
178 home after one hour on the same day and mother in law (case 05) of case 01 stayed in their house
179 from 9-11 March 2020. Case 05 returned to her home on 11 March 2020 and developed COVID-
180 19 symptoms on 13 March 2020. She was 50 years old and on antihypertensive medication. The
181 IEDCR team collected samples on 15 March 2020 The daughter in law was the caregiver of case
182 05. Although she didn't develop any symptoms but as a close contact we collected her sample to
183 perform RT-PCR for COVID-19 on 16 March 2020. Her daughter in law, aged 22 years were

184 tested positive for COVID-19 and we included her as case 08 in this report. . Case 09, aged 72
185 years was the husband of case 05 and also father in law of case 01. Case 09 was exposed to case
186 01 and case 05, the source of COVID-19 was case 05 because case 09 developed symptoms on
187 29 March 2020, which exceeded beyond the incubation period of exposure with case 01. All the
188 cases were isolated in the isolation wards of different government hospitals for minimum
189 fourteen days.

191 **Contact tracing**

192 We interviewed all the cases over phone as soon as we received the RT-PCR positive
193 result of COVID-19, to identify the contacts. We collected all the information regarding the
194 contacts from the interview. We traced 145 out of 175 contacts from all nine cases. We were
195 able to communicate all the traced contacts and ensured home quarantine for 14 days. We had
196 missed contacts as some cases had travel history using public transport. All the identified
197 contacts were tested for COVID-19 with RT-PCR. . We followed the contacts for 14 days from
198 their exposure with a COVID-19 case. Isolation of the subsequent cases and home quarantine of
199 the contacts narrowed down the number of contacts to follow up (Table 2).

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| | Contacts Identified | Missed contacts |
|---------|----------------------------|------------------------|
| Case 01 | 34 | 129 |
| Case 02 | 41 | 05 |
| Case 03 | 41 | 00 |
| Case 04 | 11 | 00 |
| Case 05 | 24 | 02 |

| | | | |
|-----|--------------|------------|------------|
| 201 | Case 06 | 08 | 01 |
| 202 | Case 07 | 07 | 05 |
| 203 | Case 08 | 05 | 00 |
| 204 | Case 09 | 04 | 03 |
| 205 | Total | 175 | 145 |

Table 2. Number of contacts per COVID-19 case at Shibchar, Madaripur, Bangladesh, March 2020

Among all the cases isolated in the hospital the condition of case 06 deteriorated and was referred to the COVID-19 dedicated Kuwait Moitri Friendship Hospital, in Dhaka on 21 March 2020 for further management. On 25 March the patient died from respiratory distress. The other cases were discharged from the hospital after they remained asymptomatic for three days and were RT-PCR negative for SARS-CoV-2 with two consecutive swab samples on consecutive days.

Containment

A containment plan was developed with the local administrative and health authority and the MoHFW by modifying an existing WHO plan for responding to an H1N1 pandemic (17). To create the containment zone, we first marked the location of residence of the index case and his

228 contacts on a map. Then we established the borders of the containment area by using natural
229 barriers such as rivers and the national highway and sub-district roads (Figure 2).




Figure-2: Map showing the containment area of Shibchar Upazila of Madaripur District, Bangladesh

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The containment plan restricted entry and exit from the containment zone. Local authorities enforced this restriction. Some pharmacies and grocery shops were identified and kept open from early morning to evening every day to provide essential goods. Pharmacists were instructed to report if they identify any suspected fever cases. A COVID-19 coordination team discussed community awareness on importance of containment with teachers and political, religious, and other community leaders. Local media and religious centers gave continuous announcements to stay home. Local administration provided support for medical emergencies in the containment zone.

239 Community health care workers visited the local community daily to find suspected cases
240 in the containment zone. Nasal and throat swabs were collected from suspected cases in the
241 community for RT-PCR testing. A “flu corner” was established in the hospital to separately test,
242 treat, and confine any person with ILI symptoms. A dedicated ambulance service was available
243 to transport suspected and confirmed COVID-19 patients to higher centers for medical care. An
244 isolation facility was identified outside the containment zone. Ambulance support from the
245 district hospital was provided to transport patients and samples in the containment zone. Training
246 on contact tracing and infection prevention and control were given to the rapid response team at
247 district and sub-district level. SOPs were developed to operate the isolation and quarantine
248 facility.


249 Volunteers from the community purchased and delivered groceries to residents. Local
250 political leaders, with the support from the administrative authority, ensured food and other
251 necessary items for day workers. The local community leaders, media and administrative
252 authority was actively involved in risk communication.

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254 **DISCUSSION**

255 Epidemiological, clinical and laboratory data confirmed that this was the first cluster of
256 COVID-19 cases in Bangladesh. The index case travelled from Italy to Bangladesh on 7 March
257 2020. After confirmation as a COVID-19 case we conducted contact tracing and identified eight
258 cases from the contact list of the index case.. To reduce further spread, Bangladesh implemented
259 the first rapid containment plan from 19 March to 3 April 2020 in the upazilla. Administrative
260 and political commitment, active involvement of the all level of health care workers and local
261 health authority, community mobilization and participation, strong involvement of media and

262 active surveillance with the guidance of the IEDCR team supported the containment effort
 263 (Figure 3).



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 265 Figure-3 Number of COVID-19 cases according to epidemiological week from March
 266 2020 to June 2020

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 268 Our study involved investigation of first cluster outbreak of COVID-19 in Bangladesh at
 269 Shibchar upazila. Although the first COVID-19 case at Shibchar Upazilla, Madaripur District
 270 was identified on 8 March 2020 but there were no secondary spread from that isolated case. On
 271 13 March 2020 we identified a cluster of COVID-19 cases in Madaripur. These two incidents
 272 were from different parts of Madaripur District and we could not identify any link between them.
 273 From 13 to 17 March, 2020 IEDCR team identified six COVID-19 cases in Shibchar Upazila of
 274 Madaripur District. From their history we established same possible exposure of the subsequent

275 cases. Therefore, we can consider this event as an early cluster of COVID-19 cases at Madaripur
276 District.

277 Although, two COVID-19 cases travelled from Italy to Bangladesh, we assumed that case
278 01 was the index case. We examined his travel history and identified that subsequent cases were
279 exposed to the index case or linked with this case. After case 01's return to Bangladesh, he
280 visited his friends and family. He was aware he was ill; he had mild symptoms and sought
281 medical treatment at Shibchar upazila health complex. He stated that he spent most of his time
282 with his family members after returning from Italy. He also mentioned that he wore mask while
283 he went outside of his home. Subsequent cases were his relatives or friends who had long and/or
284 multiple exposures with case 01.

285 In controlling spread of infectious diseases, containment is an important fundamental
286 strategy. Rapid containment strategy was developed during this cluster investigation at Shibchar.
287 Natural boundaries of the containment zone physically demarcated the boundaries and helped
288 maintain strict containment. Involvement of multiple stakeholders to implement the containment
289 strategy further reinforced isolation of suspected cases and quarantine of contacts. Moreover,
290 containment efforts were aided by the implementation of non-pharmacological interventions
291 such as social distancing, avoiding crowds and confined areas, staying home, and wearing a face
292 mask.

293 Contact tracing is an effective public health tool in controlling an infectious disease
294 outbreak (18). Contact identification and managing the contacts can break the chain of
295 transmission of the disease. In the West Africa Ebola Disease outbreak, contact tracing reduced
296 transmission in Liberia during 2014-15 (19–21). Moreover, contact tracing is an effective tool in
297 gathering information about an epidemic in other infectious diseases such as avian influenza

298 (22). In this outbreak investigation, isolation of the index case and contact tracing helped identify
299 subsequent cases. These cases had less contacts and helped make contact tracing timely and
300 manageable. Strict isolation of the cases with quarantine of the contacts and follow up limited the
301 spread to two generations.

302 Community mobilization and risk communication can augment the effectiveness of the
303 contact tracing in any infectious disease outbreak. Culturally accepted and community motivated
304 interventions adapt interventions to the local situation and help communities accept actions to
305 reduce the transmission of disease. In Shibchar Upazilla, community leaders and the local
306 administrative and health authority supported community sensitization. This helped with the
307 efforts for controlling the spread of COVID-19 by effective use of isolation, quarantine, and
308 containment. In addition, local and national media advocated acceptance of the prevention
309 strategies.

310 The number of cases at Shibchar Upazilla remained low in the weeks after the
311 commencement of containment. Active searches for suspected cases with isolation of contacts
312 and contact tracing by the local health authority further strengthen the process of slowing down
313 transmission.

314 There were some missed contacts in our study. The index case used public transport to
315 travel from his residence to Dhaka. This accounted for most of the missing contacts and was a
316 major limitation of our contact tracing activity. During that period IEDCR is the only institute to
317 perform RT-PCR for COVID-19 disease. We monitored for positive cases from missed contacts
318 of case 01 for next fourteen days. Moreover, we also monitored the surveillance data of
319 Madaripur district whether we had any cases linked with case 01. But nott such cases were
320 reported. .

321 **Conclusion:**

322 This report describes one of the first COVID-19 clusters in Bangladesh and interventions
323 to control the spread of this disease. The subsequent cases after case 01 were identified rapidly.
324 Furthermore, all the subsequent cases were from the home quarantined contacts. Rapid
325 identification of the case followed by containment, contact tracing and effective community
326 mobilization supported to break the chain of transmission of virus from the particular cluster.

327 **Ethical Approval and consent :**

328 This response was to an imminent public health emergency. IEDCR is the mandated
329 institute of the Government of the Bangladesh responsible for outbreak investigation and
330 response and communicable disease surveillance. Moreover, Directorate General of Health
331 Services identified IEDCR as the focal institute for COVID-19 response. The IEDCR
332 Institutional Review Board has a policy that response to all public health emergencies is exempt
333 from human subjects review. We obtained verbal informed consent from all the cases and
334 contacts before interviews commenced and collection of biological samples. Permission has
335 been obtained from the Director IEDCR for publication of de-identified national surveillance
336 data.

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