

Analysis of a Cournot-Bertrand Duopoly Game with Differentiated Products: Stability, Bifurcation and Control

Original Research
Article

Abstract

In this work, we investigate a Cournot-Bertrand duopoly model with product differentiation between two different firms, where one company uses price as a decision variable and the other uses quantity. The stability of the Nash equilibrium point is investigated, and the role of the parameters on the model stability is studied. It is shown that the system experiences three different types of bifurcations when the parameters go through the different boundary curves of the stability region. Furthermore, the model's bifurcation is controlled using a hybrid control strategy.

Keywords: Cournot-Bertrand; duopoly game; stability; bifurcation; chaos control

2010 Mathematics Subject Classification: 39A28; 39A30; 92D25

1 Introduction

Cournot and Bertrand were the pioneers of oligopoly research. The products in the Cournot model [10] are homogenous, and companies compete on the quantity of outputs. Firms compete on pricing in the Bertrand model [8]. There have been a few papers written in recent years about Cournot-Bertrand competition [7, 14, 15, 19]. This type of competition is characterized by the fact that the market can be subdivided into two groups of firms: the first of which optimally adjusts prices, and the other of which optimally adjusts their output to ensure maximum profit. There are examples of Cournot-Bertrand mixed models in the real world economy. For instance, in a market characterized by duopoly, one company competes in a dominating position and selects output as its decision variable, whilst the other company, which is in a disadvantageous position, selects price as its decision variable in an effort to increase its share of the market. In general, the upstream companies in the supply chain prefer output competition, while the downstream firms prefer price wars.

We consider a differentiated product market with an inverse demand function. It is assumed that the market promotes differentiated products to give consumers certain preferences and their main interests take advantage of differentiated products. The first enterprise produces quantity q_1 at price p_1 and the second enterprise produces quantity q_2 at price p_2 . Here, the competitive profile is $p = (p_1; p_2)$, where each firm wants to maximize profits based on the following:

$$\text{Max}_{p_i} (p_i; p_{-i}) = q_i p_i - C_i(q_i); \quad (1.1)$$

where p_{-i} refers to the price of some other enterprise distinct from enterprise i , and $C_i(q_i)$ is the cost function. Using the consumer preferences introduced in [18], the following utility function is given:

$$U(q_1; q_2) = a(q_1 + q_2) -$$

$\frac{1}{2}$

$\frac{1}{2}$

$(q_2$

$\frac{1}{2} + q_2$

$$\frac{1}{2} + 2bq_1q_2); \quad (1.2)$$

where $q_1; q_2; a$ are positive and $0 < b < 1$. The parameter b is an index of product differentiation.

When $b = 1$, firms produce homogeneous goods. When $b = 0$, products are unrelated and each firm is a monopolist. In this illustration, we consider the duopoly case with differentiation, $0 < b < 1$. This utility function gives rise to a linear demand structure. Inverse demands are given by $p_i =$

$\frac{a}{1-b}$

$-\frac{b}{1-b} q_i$

which are

(

$$p_1 = \frac{a}{1-b} - \frac{b}{1-b} q_1 - b q_2;$$

$$p_2 = \frac{a}{1-b} - \frac{b}{1-b} q_2 - b q_1;$$

(1.3)

$p_1; q_2$ is expressed as a function of $q_1; p_2$ and the competitive model of $q_1; p_2$ is studied as follows:

(

$$p_1 = \frac{a}{1-b} - \frac{b}{1-b} q_1 - b p_2;$$

$$q_2 = \frac{a}{1-b} - \frac{b}{1-b} p_2 - b q_1;$$

(1.4)

We consider a nonlinear cost function:

$$C_i(q_i) = c_i q_i + d_i q_i^2; \quad i, j = 1; 2; \quad i \neq j;$$

Here c_i represent marginal costs of quantity q_i which are positive and $c_i > 0$; $d_i > 0$; $i =$

1; 2 is a control parameter of cost.
 Net benefit is expressed as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_1(q_1; p_2) &= p_1 q_1 - C_1 = [a(1 - b) - (1 - b_2)q_1 + bp_2]q_1 - c_1 q_1 - d_1 q_1 (a - p_2 - bq_1) \\ \pi_2(q_1; p_2) &= p_2 q_2 - C_2 = p_2(a - p_2 - bq_1) - c_2(a - p_2 - bq_1) - d_2 q_1 (a - p_2 - bq_1) \end{aligned} \quad (1.5)$$

We assume that the firms maximize the relative profit, which is denoted by

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \pi_1(q_1; p_2)}{\partial q_1} &= 0; \\ \frac{\partial \pi_2(q_1; p_2)}{\partial p_2} &= 0; \end{aligned} \quad (1.6)$$

Substituting (1.5) into (1.6), after some modifications, we get

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \pi_1(q_1; p_2)}{\partial q_1} &= Gq_1 - Hp_2 + Eq_2 \\ &+ Fq_1 p_2; \\ \frac{\partial \pi_2(q_1; p_2)}{\partial p_2} &= -Gq_1 + Hp_2 - Eq_2 \\ &- Fq_1 p_2; \end{aligned} \quad (1.7)$$

where
 $E = (b_2 - 1) + b(d_1 - d_2)$; $F = 2b + d_1 - d_2$;
 $G = a(1 - b) - (c_1 + bc_2) - a(d_1 - d_2)$; $H = a + c_2$

According to the relative profit maximization conditions

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \pi_1}{\partial q_1} &= 0; \quad \frac{\partial \pi_2}{\partial p_2} \\ &= 0; \end{aligned}$$

, substituting equation (1.7) into them, we can get

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \pi_1}{\partial q_1} &= G + 2Eq_1 + Fp_2 = 0; \\ \frac{\partial \pi_2}{\partial p_2} &= H - 2p_2 - Fq_1 = 0; \end{aligned} \quad (1.8)$$

We assume that both firms are acting in a rational way in order to build and study the dynamics of this game. Rational behavior means that firms use short-sighted adjustment mechanisms that require them to know if their relative profits are going up or down. Using this mechanism, we build a dynamic system to explain the game process as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} q_1(t+1) &= q_1(t) + \lambda_1 q_1(t) \quad (1.9) \\ &= q_1(t) + \lambda_1 q_1(t)(G + 2Eq_1(t) + Fp_2(t)); \\ p_2(t+1) &= p_2(t) + \lambda_2 p_2(t) \\ &= p_2(t) + \lambda_2 p_2(t)(H - 2p_2(t) - Fq_1(t)); \end{aligned}$$

where
 $E = (b_2 - 1) + b(d_1 - d_2)$; $F = 2b + d_1 - d_2$;
 $G = a(1 - b) - (c_1 + bc_2) - a(d_1 - d_2)$; $H = a + c_2$;
 and $\lambda_i > 0$; $i = 1, 2$ are speed adjustment parameters.

The majority of our findings relate the stability and instability of the model's fixed points, particularly the paths that lead to the various forms of bifurcations. We direct the attention of the readers to [1-6,13,20] for a more in-depth consideration of stability, bifurcation, and chaos control.

2 Existence and stability of equilibrium points

Using the Jury condition, this section will explore the existence of fixed points as well as their stability.

We consider the set

$$\Omega = \{a; b; c_1; c_2; d_1; d_2; \lambda_1; \lambda_2\} \subset \mathbb{R}_8^+ : \text{all parameters are positive and } 0 < b < 1; 0 < c_1 < a; 0 < c_2 < ag$$

The equilibrium points (q_1^*, p_2^*) of the system (1.9) are the solutions of the following system:

$$\begin{aligned} q_1^* &= q_1^* + \lambda_1 (q_1^* (G + 2E q_1^* + F p_2^*)); \\ p_2^* &= p_2^* + \lambda_2 (p_2^* (H - 2p_2^* - F q_1^*)); \end{aligned}$$

$$p_2 = p_2 + \alpha p_2(H - 2p_2 - F - q_1);$$

where

$$E = (b_2 - 1) + b(d_1 - d_2); F = 2b + d_1 - d_2;$$

$$G = a(1 - b) - (c_1 + bc_2) - a(d_1 - d_2); H = a + c_2$$

Through some simple algebraic computations, one can verify that the system (1.9) has four equilibrium points:

$$E_0(0; 0); E_1(\frac{G}{2E}; 0); E_2(0;$$

$$H$$

$$2$$

$$); E_3(\frac{G}{2E}; 0);$$

$$H$$

$$2$$

$$); E_3(\frac{G}{2E}; 0);$$

where

$$3$$

$$\frac{G}{2E} =$$

$$\frac{(a - c_2)(d_2 - d_1) + 2(a - c_1)}{4 + (d_1 - d_2)^2};$$

$$\frac{H}{2} =$$

$$\frac{2c_2 + c_1d_1 - c_1d_2 + b(2c_1 - c_2d_1 + c_2d_2) + a(2 - d_1 + d_2)}{4 + (d_1 - d_2)^2};$$

$$\frac{H}{2} =$$

$$\frac{2c_2 + c_1d_1 - c_1d_2 + b(2c_1 - c_2d_1 + c_2d_2) + a(2 - d_1 + d_2)}{4 + (d_1 - d_2)^2};$$

$$)$$

$$4 + (d_1 - d_2)^2 :$$

The equilibrium point $E_1(\frac{G}{2E}; 0)$ exists if and only if G

$$E < 0.$$

$$E < 0.$$

By doing basic calculations, one may verify that in set Ω , $p_2 > 0$ and

$$\frac{G}{2E} =$$

$$\frac{(a - c_2)(d_2 - d_1) + 2(a - c_1)}{4 + (d_1 - d_2)^2} > 0$$

$$4 + (d_1 - d_2)^2 > 0$$

if and only if

$$d_1 - d_2 <$$

$$2(a - c_1)$$

$$a - c_2$$

$$.$$

In [12], the authors studied the model (1.9). They examined existence and stability of the fixed points. In their work, they pointed out some conditions for the existence of Nash equilibrium point.

With the help of mathematica software, we found that for the existence of Nash equilibrium point we require the parameters domain Ω and $d_1 - d_2 < 2(a - c_1)$

$$a - c_2$$

. In [12], the authors used extra conditions for

the existence of Nash equilibrium point. Moreover, we discussed rate of convergence, and we used some control techniques to control bifurcation and chaos in the model (1.9). In [12], the authors did not discussed rate of convergence and chaos control.

The point $E_3(\frac{G}{2E}; 0)$ is the unique equilibrium point of system (1.9) iff $d_1 - d_2 < 2(a - c_1)$

$$a - c_2$$

$$.$$

The Jacobian matrix of the model (1.9) at the point $(\frac{G}{2E}; 0)$ is defined as follows:

$$J =$$

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 + \frac{G}{2E}(G + F - p_2 + 4E - q_1) & -F - q_1 \\ -2F - p_2 & 1 + \frac{G}{2E}(H - 4p_2 - F - q_1) \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 + \frac{G}{2E}(G + F - p_2 + 4E - q_1) & -F - q_1 \\ -2F - p_2 & 1 + \frac{G}{2E}(H - 4p_2 - F - q_1) \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 + \frac{G}{2E}(G + F - p_2 + 4E - q_1) & -F - q_1 \\ -2F - p_2 & 1 + \frac{G}{2E}(H - 4p_2 - F - q_1) \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 + \frac{G}{2E}(G + F - p_2 + 4E - q_1) & -F - q_1 \\ -2F - p_2 & 1 + \frac{G}{2E}(H - 4p_2 - F - q_1) \end{pmatrix}$$

$$(2.1)$$

The trace T and determinant D of the matrix J are

$$T = 2 + \frac{G}{2E}(G + F - p_2 + 4E - q_1) + \frac{G}{2E}(H - 4p_2 - F - q_1);$$

$$D = 1 + \frac{G}{2E}(H - 4p_2 - F - q_1) + \frac{G}{2E}(G + 4E(1 + \frac{G}{2E}H - 4p_2)q_1 + \frac{G}{2E}G(H - 4p_2 - F - q_1)$$

$$+ F(p_2 + \frac{G}{2E}Hp_2 - \frac{G}{2E}p_2^2$$

$$- \frac{G}{2E}4E - q_1^2)$$

$$1)$$

In accordance with the Jury condition, the equilibrium point $(\frac{G}{2E}; 0)$ is considered to be stable if and only if the following conditions are met:

$$8 > T$$

$$\begin{aligned} &>: \\ T + D + 1 &> 0; \\ \square T + D + 1 &> 0; \\ D \square 1 &< 0; \end{aligned} \quad (2.2)$$

3 Rate of convergence

In this section, we are going to determine the rate of convergence of a solution that is going to converge to the Nash equilibrium point of the model (1.9).

The following result gives the rate of convergence of solutions of a system of difference equations

$$X_{n+1} = (A + B(n))X_n; \quad (3.1)$$

where X_n is an m -dimensional vector, $A \in \mathbb{C}^{m \times m}$ is a constant matrix and $B : \mathbb{Z}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{C}^{m \times m}$ is a matrix function satisfying

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \|B_n\| = 0; \quad (3.2)$$

Here $\|\cdot\|$ refers to any matrix norm that is connected to the vector norm

$$\|kx\| = \|x\|$$

p

$x_2 + y_2$:

Proposition 3.1. [16] Assume that the condition (3.2) holds. If X_n is a solution of (3.1), then either $X_n = 0$ for all large values of n or

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \|X_n\| = \rho$$

exists and is equal to the modulus of one of the eigenvalues of matrix A .

Proposition 3.2. [16] Assume that the condition (3.2) holds. If X_n is a solution of (3.1), then either $X_n = 0$ for all large values of n or

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \|X_{n+1}\| = \rho$$

exists and is equal to the modulus of one of the eigenvalues of matrix A .

Let $(q_1(t); p_2(t))$ be any solution of the model (1.9) such that $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} q_1(t) = \bar{q}_1$ and $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} p_2(t) = \bar{p}_2$. To find the error terms, one has from the model (1.9)

$$q_1(t+1) - \bar{q}_1 = q_1 + \Delta_1 q_1(t)$$

$$\bar{G} + 2E q_1(t) + F p_2(t)$$

$$\square \bar{q}_1 \square \Delta_1 \bar{q}_1$$

$$\bar{G} + 2E \bar{q}_1 + F \bar{p}_2$$

$=$

$$\bar{1} + \Delta_1 (\bar{G} + 2E(q_1(t) + \bar{q}_1) + F \bar{p}_2)$$

$$(\bar{q}_1(t) - \bar{q}_1) + \Delta_1 F q_1(t) (p_2(t) - \bar{p}_2);$$

and

$$p_2(t+1) - \bar{p}_2 = p_2(t) + \Delta_2 p_2(t)$$

$$\square F q_1(t) \square 2 p_2(t) + H$$

$$\square \bar{p}_2 \square \Delta_2 \bar{p}_2$$

$$\square F \bar{q}_1 \square 2 \bar{p}_2 + H$$

$$= \square \Delta_2 F p_2(t) (q_1(t) - \bar{q}_1) +$$

$$\bar{1} + \Delta_2 (\square F \bar{q}_1 \square 2 (p_2(t) + \bar{p}_2) + H$$

$$(p_2(t) - \bar{p}_2):$$

Let, e_{1t}
 $= q_1(t) - \bar{q}_1$ and e_{2t}
 $= p_2(t) - \bar{p}_2$ then one has

$$e_{1,t+1} = a_t e_{1t} + b_t e_{2t}$$

and

$$e_{2,t+1} = c_t e_{1t} + d_t e_{2t}$$

where

$$a_t = 1 - \alpha_1(G + 2E(q_1(t) + \bar{q}_1) + F - p_2);$$

$$b_t = -\alpha_1 F q_1(t);$$

$$c_t = -\alpha_2 F p_2(t);$$

$$d_t = 1 - \alpha_2(-F - q_1 - 2(p_2(t) + \bar{p}_2) + H);$$

Moreover,

5

lim

$$a_t = 1 - \alpha_1(G + 4E - q_1 + F - p_2);$$

lim

$$b_t = -\alpha_1 F - q_1;$$

lim

$$c_t = -\alpha_2 F - p_2;$$

lim

$$d_t = 1 - \alpha_2(-F - q_1 - 4 - p_2) + H;$$

Now the limiting system of error terms can be written as

—

$e_{1,t+1}$

$e_{2,t+1}$

—

=

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 - \alpha_1(G + 4E - q_1 + F - p_2) & -\alpha_1 F - q_1 \\ -\alpha_2 F p_2 & 1 - \alpha_2(-F - q_1 - 4 - p_2) + H \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} e_{1t} \\ e_{2t} \end{pmatrix}$$

—

e_{1t}

e_{2t}

—

which is similar to the linearized system of (1.9) about the Nash equilibrium point $(\bar{q}_1; \bar{p}_2)$:

Using the proposition (3.1), one has the following result.

Theorem 3.1. Assume that $f(q_1(t); p_2(t))g$ be a positive solution of the model (1.9) such that $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} q_1(t) = \bar{q}_1(t)$ and $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} p_2(t) = \bar{p}_2(t)$, where $(\bar{q}_1; \bar{p}_2)$ is the Nash equilibrium point of the model (1.9). Then, the error vector $e_t =$

—

e_{1t}

e_{2t}

—

of every solution of (1.9) satisfies both of the following asymptotic relations

lim

$$(k e_t)_{1 \leq t} = j_{-1:2} J(\bar{q}_1; \bar{p}_2);$$

lim

$k e_{t+1} k$

$k e_t k$

$a = 8; c_1 = 2; c_2 = 2; d_1 = 1; d_2 = 0.5; _1 = 0.1; _2 = 0.1; q_1(0) = 0.1; p_2(0) = 0.1.$

The bifurcation diagrams (2a,2b) of figure (2) depict that system experiences Neimark-Sacker bifurcation for $b _ 1:036$. The Nash equilibrium point is stable for $0 < b < 1:036$. All three inequalities of (2.2) are satisfied iff $0 < b < 1:036$. The phase portrait depicted in figure (2e) is showing that Nash equilibrium point is stable for $b = 1:03$. The phase portrait depicted in figure (2f) is showing that Nash equilibrium point is unstable due to Neimark-Sacker bifurcation for $b = 1:04$.

For model (4.1), we set the parameters and beginning conditions as follows:

$_ = 0:25; a = 8; c_1 = 2; c_2 = 2; d_1 = 1; d_2 = 0:5; _1 = 0:1; _2 = 0:1; q_1(0) = 0:1; p_2(0) = 0:1.$

7

(a) (b)

(c) (d)

(e) (f)

Figure 1: Bifurcation diagrams of (1.9) and (4.1) for $_ = 0:95; b = 1; c_1 = 2; c_2 = 2; d_1 = 1; d_2 = 3; _1 = 0:1; _2 = 0:15; q_1(0) = 0:1; p_2(0) = 0:1; a \in (0, 17)$, and phase portraits of model (1.9) for $a = 11:3$ and $a = 11:4$.

8

(a) (b)

(c) (d)

(e) (f)

Figure 2: Bifurcation diagrams of (1.9) and (4.1) for $_ = 0:25; a = 8; c_1 = 2; c_2 = 2; d_1 = 1; d_2 = 0:5; _1 = 0:1; _2 = 0:1; q_1(0) = 0:1; p_2(0) = 0:1; a \in (0, 1; 1:15)$, and phase portraits of model (1.9) for $b = 1:03$ and $b = 1:04$.

9

The bifurcation diagrams (2c,2d) of figure (2) depict that system experiences Neimark-Sacker bifurcation for $b _ 1:13789$. It confirms that Neimark-Sacker bifurcation is delayed in controlled model (4.1).

The similar investigation for other parameters $c_1; c_2; d_1; d_2; _1; _2$ can be done by taking one of the parameters as bifurcation parameter and fixing all other parameters. All parameters are affecting the stability of Nash equilibrium point of model (1.9).

6 Conclusion

We studied a dynamic version of the Cournot-Bertrand competition in this paper. In particular, we looked at how a duopoly game changes when one company competes on price and the other on quantity. Conditions for the existence and local stability of the Nash equilibrium are established. The impacts of parameters on Nash equilibrium point stability are investigated. Using numerical investigations, we have examined the study of bifurcation, which leads to qualitative changes in the behavior of games and leads to loss of stability of Nash equilibrium. When the parameters of the system exceed the boundary curve of the stable zone, three distinct types of bifurcations are discovered: period-doubling, Neimark-Sacker, and transcritical bifurcations. This indicates that the dynamic behavior of the outputprice game becomes more complicated. In addition, a hybrid control mechanism is used in order to bring bifurcation and chaos under control. It has been shown via numerical examples that the bifurcation in the modified controlled model occurs later than in original model as a result of the hybrid control strategy.

Acknowledgment

Authors are grateful to anonymous reviewers for their constructive criticism, valuable suggestions and contributions on improving the paper.

Competing Interests

Authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

References

- [1] Ahmed, R. (2020). Complex dynamics of a fractional-order predator-prey interaction with harvesting. *Open journal of discrete applied mathematics*, 3(3), 24-32.
- [2] Ahmed, R., Ahmad, A., Ali, N. (2022). Stability analysis and Neimark-Sacker bifurcation of a nonstandard finite difference scheme for Lotka-Volterra prey-predator model, *Communications in Mathematical Biology and Neuroscience*, 2022, Article ID 61.
- [3] Ahmed, R., Akhtar, S., Mukhtar, M., Anwar, F. (2021). Bifurcation and chaos control of a system of rational difference equations, *Results in nonlinear analysis*, 4(3), 169-178.
- [4] Ahmed, R., Yazdani, M. S. (2022). Complex dynamics of a discrete-time model with prey refuge and Holling type-II functional response, *J. Math. Comput. Sci.*, 12, Article ID 113.

10

- [5] Akhtar, S., Ahmed, R., Batool, M., Shah, N. A., Chung, J. D. (2021). Stability, bifurcation and chaos control of a discretized Leslie prey-predator model. *Chaos, solitons and fractals*, 152, 111345. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2021.111345>.
- [6] Albert, C. J. L. (2012). *Regularity and complexity in dynamical systems*. Springer-Verlag New York.
- [7] Askar, S. S., Al-Khedhairi, A. (2017). Analysis of nonlinear duopoly games with product differentiation: stability, global dynamics, and control.
- [8] Bertrand, J. (1883). Review of theorie mathematique de la richesse sociale and recherches sur les principes mathematique de la theorie des richesse, *Journal des Savants*, 67, 499-508.
- [9] Chen, G., Dong, X. (1998). *From Chaos to Order: Perspectives, Methodologies, and Applications*, World Scientific, Singapore.
- [10] Cournot, A. (1838). *Researches sur Les Principes Mathematiques de La Theorie des Richesses*, Hachette, Paris, France.
- [11] Din, Q. (2017). Neimark-Sacker bifurcation and chaos control in Hassell-Varley model, *J. Differ. Equ. Appl.*, 23(4), 741-762.
- [12] Dou, Y., Liu, X. (2021). Complex dynamics in a mixed duopoly game based on relative profit maximization, *Asian journal of probability and Statistics*, 11(2), 47-57.
- [13] Kuznetsov, Y. (2004). *Elements of applied bifurcation theory*, applied mathematical sciences. Springer-Verlag New York, series volume 112, third edition.
- [14] Ma, J., Sun, L., Hou, S., Zhan, X. (2018). Complexity study on the Cournot-Bertrand mixed duopoly game model with market share preference, *Chaos*, 28, 023101.
- [15] Naimzada, A. K., Tramontana, F. (2012). Dynamic properties of a Cournot-Bertrand duopoly game with differentiated products, *Economic modelling*, 29, 1436-1439.
- [16] Pituk, M. (2002). More on Poincares and Perrons theorems for difference equations, *Journal of difference equations and applications*, 8(3), 201-216.
- [17] Romeiras, F. J., Grebogi, C., Ott, E., Dayawansa, W. P. (1992). Controlling chaotic dynamical systems, *Physica D*, 58, 165-192.
- [18] Singh, N., Vives, X. (1984). Price and quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly, *Rand journal of Economics*, 15(4), 546-554.
- [19] Wang, H., Ma, J. (2014). Complexity analysis of a Cournot-Bertrand duopoly game with different expectations, *Nonlinear Dyn.* 78, 2759-2768.
- [20] Wiggins, S. (2003). *Introduction to applied nonlinear dynamical systems and chaos*. Springer-Verlag New York, series volume 2, second edition.
- [21] Yuan, L. G., Yang, Q. G. (2015). Bifurcation, invariant curve and hybrid control in a discrete-time predator-prey system, *Appl. Math. Model.* 39(8), 2345-2362.